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This dissertation of limited scope traces the attempts by Gorbachev 
(1985-1991) to reform an economic, political and social system which was in 
a state of terminal decline. 
The origins of its demise, it is argued, lay in the ossified command 
economy inherited from Stalin. The enormous damage inflicted on Soviet 
agriculture during collectivisation in the 1930s, when millions of productive 
peasants died, proved to be a fatal blow to that sector. 
Thus, Gorbachev followed a two-fold strategy of reform. Glarmost 
(openness) was introduced to allow constructive debate on economic and 
social matters. Despite a hesitant beginning, the right to criticise allowed the 
emergence more radical campaigners, such as Yeltsin who demanded 
greater democracy .. Significantly, the revival of ethnic nationalist demands in 
the republics led to disintegration. 
Perestroika (restructuring) was intended to modernise and boost living 
standards. The economy faltered but the market was not yet in place. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The gradual collapse of the Soviet Union in the second half of the penultimate 
decade of the twentieth century was definitely an event of enormous significance 
for both the USSR and the entire world order. It dramatically altered the 
geo-strategic balance of power which had prevailed in post Second World War 
Europe, bringing an end to the Cold War. Much of the credit for this dramatic 
unraveling of the status quo can be ascribed to the actions and efforts of one 
individual: Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. 
This dissertation oflimited scope explores the political and economic 
consequences unleashed by Gorbachev' s reforms. It is divided into four main 
chapters. Chapter 1 examines the historical context in which he was operating as 
a reformer. A comparison with the only previous major reformer in the Soviet era, 
Nikita Krushchev, will be drawn. He had attempted to humanise Soviet socialism 
and bring some degree of structural reform with a measured degree of success-
chiefly by abolishing mass terror as a political instrument - and had been ousted by 
Leonid Brezhnev in a Party - based coup in 1964. Whilst Krushchev had headed the 
Soviet state in the 1950s after Stalin's death in 1953, his fate had always provided a 
sobering background to any future reformer and Gorbachev was no exception. 
This mini-thesis will examine a number of factors which have occupied 
observers. Thus, what was the Soviet state? Was it a national entity on its own or 
was it the old Tsarist empire which Lenin and Stalin had transformed into a 
single political union masquerading as the world's first socialist state? The 
structural weaknesses of the Soviet Union were most strikingly evident in the 
command economy inherited from Stalin and which had, in the 1930s, propelled a 
previously agrarian society into a major industrial power. Since the death of the 
dictator in the early 1950s, the Soviet economy remained locked into the central 
planning of all commodities and the market played little role in regulating it This 
was especially most evident in its manner of operating and, despite the relative 
improvement in living standards, the basic economic structure of Stalinism 
l 
remained in place. Supply and demand was no consideration in the economy's 
functioning and consumer goods were especially in short supply. Indeed, when 
available they were invariably of inferior quality and there was little scope for any 
kind of export driven production to improve standards of quality control. The 
Soviet economy focused on the production of heavy industrial goods, with the 
military receiving the lion's share of already scarce resources. This first chapter will 
examine how the preoccupation with central planning resulted in huge distortions. 
Bureaucrats (the apparat) dictated the quantity of goods manufactured in every 
region of the Soviet Union and the workers paid little attention to the final product. 
Not surprisingly, shortages came to characterise daily life under communism. Other 
vital features which merit important consideration were rampant alcoholism (at the 
work place), absenteeism and the disastrous state of Soviet agriculture. Indeed, the 
failure of the empire to feed its population despite its ample resources proved to be 
a telling indictment of the USSR and its system. This was the legacy which the new 
General Secretary inherited and provides the background to perestroika. Finally, a 
brief biographical sketch of Gorbachev will be provided at the end of the chapter. 
Chapter 2 concentrates on glasnost (openness) and its unintended role 
in bringing about the disintegration of the Soviet state. Thus dramatic and 
destabilising effects on the Soviet totalitarian regime occurred. The regime had 
rigidly controlled the civil liberties of citizens, prescribed what books or 
nev..-spapers ordinary people could read and is rightly the focus of an entire chapter. 
Of crucial importance to bear in mind is that Gorbachev, on succeeding Konstantin 
Chernenko at the helm of the Soviet Communist Party (or CPSL) on 11 March 
I 985, had initially no intention of dismantling the Soviet political system which 
enshrined in its constitution the leading role of that Party. This provided it with a 
complete monopoly on the economic system and political organisation. 
Thus, Chapter 2 will concentrate on both short term and long term goals 
which Gorbachev set himself and his team of reformers. The overwhelming 
expectation was that the controlied admission of public criticism and the airing of 
grievances would facilitate the smoother functioning of the prevailing system which 
Soviet ideologists termed 'developed socialism'. The rule of Leonid Brezhnev 
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( 1964-1982) was labelled by the new leadership as 'the era of stagnation' and was 
particularly criticised for its reversion to the Stalinist tactic of the stifling of all 
debate, whether political or economic. Thus, reasoned the reformers, a certain 
amount of political liberalisation was essential for the sake of renewing both society 
and political strnctures. Without it, how could the already well known levels of 
apathy and corruption which were to be found all over the USSR to be combated? It 
must be stressed that the new General Secretary always maintained his Marxist 
credentials and insisted he was a dedicated disciple of Lenin. 
Yet, glasnost proved to be a genie, which once released from its 
proverbial bottle, would rapidly confront both leaders and ordinary Soviet 
citizens with many unexpected challenges during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
There existed a very powerful anti-reform block within the CPSU which was 
implacably opposed to glasnost and its potential consequences for the authority 
of the Party. Whilst the economy faced a systematic crisis, which was 
acknowledged even by hard-line communists, many decision-makers favoured 
more the Chinese approach which stressed the need for economic reform while 
continuing to emphasise the unchallenged right of the Communist Party to govern. 
Attention will, however, be paid to Gorbachev's broader social and political vision 
as many observers were aware that glasnost was necessary to renew a moribund 
dysfunctional society, economy and political structure which was dying a slow 
death. Eventually, the liberalisation of the media, the continued damning exposures 
of Stalin's crimes and the subsequent election in 1989 of an elected, though 
imperfect, Congress of People's Deputies were developments which would lead to 
the collapse of Communist rule in the USSR and the end of Soviet power. 
Gorbachev did, once settled in office, reform the CPSU leadership, easing 
out many hardliners. An example was the brief elevation of Andrei Gromyko to 
the Presidency, a largely ceremonial position at the time. He had been foreign 
minister since Stalin's time. But, Gorbachev's major achievement was the election 
of a Congress of People's Deputies, which though far from perfect, did allow a 
considerable degree of genuine democracy in its election. 
Chapter 3 focuses on how Gorbachev attempted to grapple with the dire 
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state of the command economy, particularly of his remedy of perestroika or 
restructuring for its sorry state. Central planning of all legitimate economic 
activity had spawned a gigantic bureaucracy which possessed a major overriding 
interest in maintaining Soviet socialism in its unreformed state. This apparat was 
assisted in its attempts to swim against the fresh tides of reform, particularly 
perestroika, by allying itself with ideological conservatives who regarded the new 
refom1s as a betrayal of their Marxist-Leninist principles. The command economy, 
it must be conceded, had been of great value in repelling the invasion of Nazi 
Germany, but had long since ceased to satisfy the public's demand for consumer 
goods. On the other hand, credit for furnishing the huge supplies which kept 
the Soviet Red Army in the field must also go largely to the United States. This 
reality was often ignored by Soviet commentators, which is perhaps not 
surprising considering the USSR's huge losses in tern1s of human lives and the 
enormous destruction of its cities and towns it suffered. 
Chapter 3 will also explore how perestroika had such a disastrous effect 
on the Soviet economy with both industry and agriculture actually rapidly 
deteriorating. Various commentators have examined the reasons for this and these 
will be alluded to and analysed. Also to be discussed will be why, after seventy 
years of stamping out all manifestations of private economic activity, the Soviet 
Union fared so poorly. The absence of private property due to ideological dictates 
was, I will argue, a major reason for perestroika's dismal results, as the absence 
of a legal framework for it was a sine qua non for any successful implementation 
of the policy. The recognition of the need for a law-based society and state was 
one of Gorbachev's preoccupations as it was a prerequisite for the necessary 
investment, whether foreign or domestic. The evolution of Gorbachev from being 
a cautious reformer to finally embracing the need for a market economy is an 
important theme in Chapter 3. Gorbachev was, indeed, a unique species of Soviet 
communist. As leader in the Stavropol region of the Union he became aware of 
the great waste of industrial commodities and grain. Additionally, his rise in the 
hierarchy of the CPSU had afforded him the privilege to travel abroad and he had 
\-vitnessed personally the huge gulf between the West and his own country. Seeds 
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doubt as to the superiority of socialism must have been implanted in his mind. 
Chapter 4 deals with the problems which the new climate engendered by 
Gorbachev's reforms had on the vexed nationality question, and how these fifteen 
republics, differentiated along linguistic, cultural and religious lines, came to 
rapidly unravel in six short years. The resurgence of militant ethnic nationalism was 
a direct consequence of glasnost, although most observers were aware that the old 
repressive methods previously operating had merely obscured far deeper problems 
which lay beneath the surface. It is clear, given the demographic and historical 
realities prevailing, that the forces tending towards the dissolution of the Soviet 
state were far too powerful for any non-repressive politician to arrest. 
The rise of nationalism in all regions of the USSR will be assessed, with 
its flourishing in the three Baltic republics being the most immediate danger for the 
Union. The simultaneous formation of popular fronts allowing independent ethnic 
mobilisation played a crucial role in exposing the crude lies of Soviet propaganda 
which both concealed the Molotov-Ribbentropp pact which had allowed the 
USSR to forcibly incorporate Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the Union. Other 
regions, in particular the tense state of the three Transcaucasian republics (including 
an inter-ethnic war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1988 over the enclave of 
Nagorno-Karabakh), developments in the 200 million strong Slavic heartland of 
the Soviet Union where perestroika was most keenly experienced, and the 
traditionally Islamic region of Central Asia which remained the least developed 
part of the USSR, will be analysed and assessed. Finally, the failed coup of 19-21 
August 1991 will be examined in Chapter 4. The combination of the deteriorating 
economy and the concurrent rise of intense feelings of nationalist solidarity led to 
the putsch which many observers had been anticipating. Gorbachev had not fallen 
into the same predicament and alienation from his Politburo as Krushchev because 
he had always claimed to be occupying the middle ground between more 
radical reformers and the hardline communists. Ironically, it took the signing of a 
new all-Union treaty which drastically curbed the authority of the Soviet centre 
to finally motivate the latter to act. I will discuss how the failure of the coup led 
the rapid political disintegration of the USSR in December 1991 and its 
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replacement by fifteen successor states. 
Regarding the historiography on this subject, a considerable wealth of 
source material has been built up since the second half of the 1980s until the 
present post-Soviet era. The major sources I have made use of range from 
Gorbachev's own publication 'New thinking for our country and the world' 1 which 
was published in 1987 and provides valuable insight into the early motives and the 
ideals which he held. Other major sources are Brown's 'The Gorbachev Factor'2 
(1996) which provides a scholarly, chronological analys.is of the initial enthusiasm 
for reform which was followed by disintegration. Brown also analyses how 
Gorbachev managed to retain power for so long despite the enormous pressures 
from left and right he faced. His work is an immensely valuable tool for assessing 
the new leader's motives and goals, and he also illustrates the serious decline of the 
Soviet Union. It is a major source for this dissertation oflimited scope. Goldman3 
reviews the condition of the Soviet economy in the years immediately prior to the 
USSR's collapse and particularly mentions contradictions in the execution of 
reform. He provides excellent anecdotal evidence as to why perestroika was not 
working in reality and the public's perception of this. McCauley's biographical 
profile of Gorbachev 4 follows the chronology of his rise from StavTopol to his 
elevation to being General Secretary of the CPSU and analyses why reform failed 
so rapidly. M1ynar5 emphasises, from a reforming East European perspective, the 
fate of previous attempts at reform, particularly the cases of Hungary (1956) and 
Czechoslovakia( 1968). An imponant aspect of all these sources is that they 
emphasise Gorbachev's slim chance of success in his reforms. They also point to 
the risks of failure and the danger of the revival ofneo-Stalinism. ,.\11 a2ree on the 
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need for major structural reform for a dying economy and suffocating social and 
political order but that there was little prospect of a successful outcome. 
1 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika, new thinking for our countrv and the world, (London, Collins. 1987). 
=Archie Brown, The Gorbachev factor. (Oxford, Oxford University Press. 1996). 
3 Marshall I. Goldman, What went wrong with perestroika, (New York, London, W.W. Norton and 
company, 199 l) 
4 Martin McCauley, Gorbachev, (London and New York, Longman, 1998). 
5 Zdenek Mlynar, Can Gorbachev change the Soviet Unio!!, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1990). 
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Coleman's6 work sketches the influence of the KGB on the public 
mindset, and the problems caused by the interference of the bureaucrats in the 
operation of the economy and their role in retarding the success of reform. The 
human and natural resources in the USSR were abundant. Thus there was a vast 
reservoir of scientists who could have achieved major technological advances 
leading to the conquest of world markets, particularly were their energies to be 
diverted from the sophisticated field of military electronics to making consumer 
goods for export. This was prevented by ideology. Coleman's work is a balanced 
and interesting perspective on what perestroika might have achieved. Satter's7 
book chronicles how glasnost dramatically altered the mindset of Soviet public 
opinion. The magnitude of Stalin's crimes were laid bare and his successors' 
continuing suppression of dissent, including abusing psychiatry for political 
purposes, undermined the credibility of the Party. Satter pays particular attention 
to the experiences of individual citizens trying, for example, to rectify injustices 
in a totalitarian state. Strayer8 provides a history of Russia and the USSR and 
then sketches Gorbachev's dilemma. He compares Soviet and Chinese efforts and 
approaches to reform and asks: "Might a more sequenced approach, delaying 
political change until a market economy took hold, have prevented the Soviet 
Union's disintegration? But without the pressure of glasnost and democratization, 
could essential reforms have been implemented at all?"9 The final major source 
is Kotkin 10 who reviews the history of reform and notes the threat to the incumbent 
General Secretary from conservative communist hardliners. He also reviews the 
unhappy state of post-Soviet Russia and how it is struggling to find a dignified role 
in a post-Cold War world. 
The general consensus of most historical scholars is that change was both 
essential and inevitable. The sheer scope of the task Gorbachev set himself and 
the evolution of these structural deficiencies over decades stood against any 
realistic chance of success for perestroika. It was only Gorbachev's skiH as a 
6 Fred Coleman, The decline and fall of the Soviet Unio!!, (New York, St.Martin's Press,1996). 
7 David Satter. Age of deliri!J!!b (New York, Alfred A Knopf, 1996 ). 
8 Robert Strayer, Why did the Soviet Union collapse?. (New York, London, M.E.Sharpe, 1998). 
9 Ibid, p.121. 
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master politician which allowed him to remain at the helm for so long. Whilst the 
Soviet Union did possess certain achievements, such as universal health care and 
widespread access to education, most sources argue that the stifling of all 
democratic debate, the omnipresent secret police and persecution of dissidents 
outweigh any positive features of developed socialism. 
1
•.1 Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon averted. (Oxford, Oxford University Press. 200 J ). 
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CHAPTER 1 
The back_groupd to decline. 
1.1 The struggling Sovi~t economy and Gorbach~v: the backgrou11il 
Gorbachev, on assuming the leadership of the Soviet Union, was immediately 
perceived by Western Sovietologists to be a man very much in the mould of 
Yuri Andropov. He had been a recent predecessor of Gorbachev and had headed 
the much feared omnipresent security service, the KGB. In this capacity, 
Andropov had gained important insights into the serious problems facing the 
Soviet economy and had indicated to the USSR's establishment that drastic reform 
of it would be the highest priority. He made his intentions clear by his demands 
for labour discipline and his attempts to take measures against the widespread 
alcoholism in the work force. Andropov died prematurely in February 1984. His 
reforms were, however, a precursor of the far more comprehensive structural and 
social reforms of Gorbachev, after his elevation to the leadership in March 1985. 
The question must be posed as to why the Soviet economy was in such 
dire need of reform that even a convinced neo-Stalinist such as Andropov realised 
that drastic measures to rescue the situation had to be taken. Gorbachev inherited 
an economic structure which, to the maximum extent possible, ignored 
fundamental market realities which Western free market economies took for 
granted. The USSR also, according to Kotkin1, spent between twenty to thirty 
percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on maintaining its superpower status, 
a figure which could only be achieved by reducing its consumer spending and 
depriving ordinary citizens of an adequate supply of such commodities. Whilst 
Lenin had been the political founder of the Soviet state and had been the chief 
ideological architect of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 - he had even staged a 
1 S.Kotkin, Armageddon averted, p.61. 
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strategic retreat to capitalist economic principles (his New Economic Policy or 
NEP) to reinvigorate economic activity, particularly in the vast rural areas of the 
new state - his successor Stalin had laid down the intricate framework of the 
command economy. This variant of communist economics emphasised the central 
planning of all economic activity and its most pervasive characteristic had been the 
rapid construction of a massive capital goods industry from scratch during the 
1930s. The first five year plan, begun on 1 October 1928, was fulfilled in four 
years. Some of the results achieved were impressive. McCauley writes: "Great new 
industrial centres in the Urals, Kuzbass and the Volga took shape and the 
traditional areas such as Leningrad, Moscow and the Donbass also expanded. "2 
He supplies other impressive statistics: "Electricity output by 1932 had almost 
trebled since 1928, hard coal and oil had almost doubled. So energy was a great 
success although no branch actually fulfilled its plan. Steel output however was 
disappointing. Production only climbed from 4 million tom1es in 1927-28 to 5.9 
million tonnes in 193 2; pig iron, on the other hand, jumped from 3 .3 million tonnes 
to 6.2 million tonnes in 1932."3This development had been achieved at an 
enormous cost, particularly when measured in sheer human terms, but the Soviet 
dictator had conceived it as absolutely essential for the infant revolutionary state to 
survive in an immensely hostile world. Indeed, it had been pivotal in providing the 
USSR with the heavy weaponry needed to resist and repel the onslaught of Nazi 
Germany and had been fundamental to the Allied victory in the Second World 
War. One of its most negative aspects had been the immensely brutal 
collectivisation of agriculture in which millions of the lives of the most productive 
peasants (the so-called kulaks or rich peasants) had been deliberately destroyed. 
The Ukraine suffered in particular with an artificially induced famine decimating 
the rural population. David Satter describes in moving detail this brutality and 
quotes from a book by Volodymyr Manyak and Lidia Kovalenko: ''What happened 
in 1933"4, said Manyak, "exceeded all the dark dreams of the hangmen of the 
world. The perpetrators had high positions in the Communist system and turned 
2 MartinMcCauley, The Soviet Union 1917-1991, (Longman, London, 1993),pp.80,81. 
3 Ibid, p.81. 
4 Satter, Age of deliriµm, p.370. 
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their punishing sword on their own people. In the earth lie 9 million of our 
people."5 Victory in the war had greatly entrenched the system of the command 
economy and its scope of operation had been extended to many of the now subject 
nations of Eastern Europe by the occupation by the Red Army in 1945. This new 
«outer empire" which the Soviet Union had acquired was most notable in its 
duplication of the Soviet model of economic organisation. It was bound together in 
Comecon as a single socialist economic zone and it was to survive more than four 
decades until its collapse in 1989 due to Gorbachev's reform policy. 
Within the "inner empire" of the Soviet Union itself, all of Stalin's 
successors - the dictator died in 1953- were confronted with his legacy, a reality 
which embraced the entire social, economic and political structure of this vast 
domain. A trade mark of his era had been the widespread use of terror against all 
his opponents, and millions even of loyal communists had either been executed or 
perished in Soviet labour camps in the frozen Arctic 'vvastes of the north. Thus, it 
is to the considerable credit of Nikita Krushchev, his successor in the Kremlin; 
that he both ended this policy and even had the courage to denounce Stalin as a 
mass murderer to a stunned 1956 Congress of the Communist Party. Krushchev 
had been a beneficiary of the rapid promotion in the Party due to the terror but 
he also emerged as its first major reformer. He was acutely conscious of the 
enormous dangers and inherent risks in reform and renunciation of the elaborate 
personality cult of Stalin. He tended to concentrate, therefore, on economic reform 
and strengthening the USSR's international prestige. He engaged in what Pearson 
refers to as "daring new projects like the inititially spectacular if ultimately fla"rved 
'Virgin lands scheme' in Central Asia"6 which aimed at turning vast tracts of 
desert into irrigated farmland. The author remarks: "Espousing causes w-hich 
portrayed him as an authentic 'man of the people', Krushchev sought out photo 
opportunities in which he unblushingly appeared as a proletarian among 
proletarians one day and a peasant among peasants the next."7 His rule also 
co-incided with the Soviet Union's most prestigious scientific achievement, the 
6 R Pearson, The rise and fall of the So\iet empire, (St. Martin's Press, New York 1998), p.49. 
7 Ibid 
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launching of the first manned space flight in 1959. Besides this, the Soviet grip on 
the nations of Eastern Europe was tightened. Strayer alludes to certain positive 
features of the Krushchev reforms such as «housing, long neglected in the Stalin 
years, almost doubled during Krushchev's decade in power. And, by relying 
increasingly on nuclear weapons, he tried to reduce military spending on more 
expensive conventional forces. "8 
McCauley identifies some interesting data on the Soviet economy during 
th'= period 1951-65. Whilst population growth remained constant at 1.4 per cent, 
Gross National Product growth averaged 5.9 per cent between 1956-60, and 
decreased to 5 per cent between 1962-65. Crucially, growth in industrial output 
declined from 8.3 per cent between 1956-60 to 6.6 per cent during 1961-65. The 
worst performer was agriculture which reflected figures of 4.2 per cent growth in 
the former period, declining to 2. 8 per cent between 1961-65. 9 Thus, the heady 
years of the 1930s were now a distant memory and economic reality was setting 
in. Krushchev's successors were going to realise this even more in the corning 
decades. 
Perhaps being a foreshadow of what was to come during the latter half 
of the 1980s, Krushchev attempted to clip the wings of the hugely bloated 
economic bureaucracy. Even in the 1950s he was aware that "the chief problem, 
in his view, was the enormous power of those ministries responsible for various 
branches of the economy". 10 W.J.Tompson makes an interesting comparison 
beh:veen Krnshchev and Gorbachev as reformers: "Reformist policies involve an 
attempt to rescue essential values (in terms ofregirne survival or goals) by 
sacrificing inessential ones."11 Krushchev's attempts to rescue the essence of 
socialism was, in a sense, easier because of the nature of the post Second World 
War environment within which he was operating. The first three decades following 
the war, until the oil crisis of 1973, were a period of continual economic prosperity 
8 R Strayer, Whv did the Soviet Union collapse?, p.49. 
9 M.McCauley, The Soviet Union 1917-91, p.251. 
10 R.Strayer, Why did the Soviet Union collapse?, p.49. 
11 W.J.Tompson, 'Krushchev and Gorbachev as reformers: A comparison', British Journal of Political 
Science, vol.23, no.I, 1993, p.79. 
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and the period of relative peace for the Soviet Union enabled it to focus on 
economic goals. Certain significant factors coalesced. The enormous investment 
in heavy industry during the 1930s had laid a foundation for increasing the 
quantities of industrial production (as indicated earlier), there was a large pool of 
manpower from demobilised soldiers entering formal employment and there was 
an important benefit to the rebuilding effort in the Soviet Union from reparations 
from East Germany especially. Certainly, economic efficiency was not a serious 
factor, a real dilemma which the empire would soon face. Gorbachev was 
confronted with an entirely different set of circumstances. An entire generation had 
gro"vn up without personal experience of the sacrifices and horrors of war and had 
been promised a huge improvement in their living standards by Soviet propaganda. 
These promises, however, were not fulfilled, which was an important factor in the 
dissident movement which sprang up during the Brezhnev years. Many Soviet 
citizens were aware that there was an enormous gulf which separated their country 
from the developed Western nations. Tompson observes: "'By 1985, falling rates of 
growth and the accumulating evidence of economic (and consequently social) 
stagnation had left it in tatters: this enormous stagnation also undermined the 
Soviet Union's ability to support its foreign and defence policies."12 Thus, 
Krushchev had intervened in Hungary by cmshing the first major insurrection 
against communist rule. Gorbachev, on the other ha..11d, could not have acted 
similarly even had he so desired as the consequent economic fallout and 
international opprobrium which would have ensued would have shattered his hona 
fides as a reformer. Vital funds and the desperately needed foreign investment 
required by perestroika would not have been forthcoming from the West. 
Perhaps the most enduring legacy of the Stalin era was the brutal crnshing 
of dissent. ·whilst Krushchev had managed to put an end to terror as a political 
instrnment and even permitted a somewhat brave thaw when critical literary 
\.vorks such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn's One da_y in the lffe of Ivan Denisovich 
could be published, all organised opposition to rule by the communists was 
relentlessly crushed. Particularly once the thaw was over, all the features and 
12 Ibid., p.83 
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trappings of totalitarianism reasserted themselves. Widespread censorship of 
books, plays and even poetry were routine features of life in the USSR. No 
alternative account to the orthodox communist version of history was permitted. 
All academic disciplines, including the natural sciences, had to pay homage to 
Marxism-Leninism as the final answer to the scientific organisation of social, 
economic and political life. The Party line was slavishly followed by all the 
media, including the press, radio and television. This obsession which allowed 
even an absurd construction of reality - for example refusing to allow reporting on 
any news which might dent the illusion of the Soviet Union as a workers' paradise 
- was regarded by the authorities as normal. Because the USSR was a paradise, it 
was not a surprise that all news of economic problems remained a closely guarded 
secret. 
l.2 The Soviet Union under Brezhnev: 1964-82. 
Leonid Brezhnev ousted Nikita Krushchev in a Party - inspired coup in 1964. The 
reasons behind this are summed up by McCauley: ''The long journey of the 
Soviet Union through revolution, war, civil war, the semi-bourgeois era of't'-i'EP, 
crash industrialisation and enforced collectivisation, the savage war of 1941-45, 
the harsh post-war years, the unending industrial and agricultural experimentation 
of the Krushchev years, led those who survived to long for consolidation, calm, 
certainty, stability and a minimum of innovation The moment \.Vas ripe for a 
careful consensus-seeking bureaucrat to lead the USSR. The man most suited by 
temperament and political instinct turned out to be Leonid llich Brezhnev."D A 
brief review of his period at the summit of the Soviet leadership clearly illustrates 
the downward trend of the economy. The Soviet figures for economic output 
during the eighth Five Year Plan (FYP), from l 966-70, were optimistic as they 
indicated that there was an increase of 4 l per cent in national income and that 
13 M.McCauley, The Soviet Union 1917-1991, p.286. 
industrial output was up 50 per cent. 14 The figures for agriculture were more 
worrying as they suggested that this branch of the economy had still failed to 
respond to the massive investments it had been allocated. 
The ninth FYP (1971-75), however, revealed that the increase in economic 
growth was shortlived. National income only grew 28 per cent instead of the 
planned 38.6 per cent. Again, the major culprit remained agriculture which grew 
only 13 per cent instead of the desired 23 per cent. 15 Poor harvests in 1972 and 
1975 were blamed and the USSR became a major importer of American grain. 
McCauley observes that the population of the empire increased by 5 per cent 
during 1971-75 and "if investment going into branches supplying agriculture, 
machinery, fertilisers and so on is added then about one rouble in three was being 
invested in the agricultural sector in the second half of the 1970s".16 
However, positive factors in the international arena came to assert 
themselves. The Soviet Union received a huge windfall in receipts from the 
dramatic escalation in oil prices in 1973 and again in 1979. Kotkin sketches the 
magnitude of these developments: "From 1973 to 1985, energy exports accounted 
for 80 per cent of the USSR's expanding hard currency earnings. Other oil 
exporting countries - top customers for Soviet weapons - saw their oil revenues 
increase from 23 billion dollars in 1972 to 140 billion dollars in 1977."17The 
receipts from all this hard currency flooding into an economy which was 
exhibiting serious indications of struggling to grow, even at a much lower rate, was 
largely wasted. The satellite regimes of Eastern Europe were propped up, a huge 
military buildup entrenched the USSR' s status as a rival superpower to the United 
States, the war in Afghanistan was subsidised, and the Soviet elite, including the 
bureaucracy, were given increased perks and, according to Kotkin, "oil financed 
the acquisition of Western technology for making cars, synthetic fibres, and other 
products for consumers, as well as Western feed for Soviet livestock". 18 But it 
would have been better utilised had it been employed to promote the structural 
14 lbid., p.294. 
15 lbid. 
16 lbid., p.295. 
17 S.Kotkin, Armageddon averted, p.15. 
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reform so urgently needed - including dealing with what the author calls the 
empire's "rust belt"19- a reality that Western steel firms had had to deal with by 
drastically improving productivity and reducing both output and employee 
numbers in the 1970s. 
1.3. External commitments and the internal economic decline of the Soviet 
superpower. 
The problem with the Kremlin's superpower status in the context of foreign 
relations was that, while facing Nato in the west and China on its southern border, 
the USSR was too strategically stretched. This was to be particularly evident when 
the political and economic implosion resulting from Gorbachev's reforms began 
very rapidly to undermine the capacity of the Soviet Union to respond and even 
consider intervening. The burdens of empire in Eastern Europe, whose people 
were growing more restive every year (the example of the Solidarity free trade 
union in Poland in the late 1970s illustrates this), as well as the maintenance of an 
over ambitious foreign policy were causing a great strain on the limited 
economic resources of the Soviet Union. Thus, the propping up of client socialist 
states in the Third World, particularly in Africa, came increasingly to drain the 
Soviet treasury of resources which could more wisely have been spent 
domestically. 
Thus, the acquisition of superpower status by the Soviet Union became 
something of a two-edged sword for both the USSR's leaders and citizens. It was 
a cause for pride and a millstone around the Union's neck. There can be little 
doubt that this strategic overstretch, dictated by both communist ideology and 
Russian nationalistic ambitions which can even be traced back to Tsarist times, 
multiplied the difficulties of a reformer such as Gorbachev. There remained the 
unresolved Afghan conflict which was proving to be an unpopular quagmire for 
the leaders, having been inherited from Brezhnev who dispatched one hundred 
18 Ibid., p.16. 
19 Ibid., p.17 
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thousand Soviet troops to Afghanistan to prop up an unpopular communist 
government on Christmas day, 1979. The fact is that the Soviet economy had, 
during Brezhnev's leadership (1964-82), finally come to stagnate, as indicated 
earlier, despite being able to continue functioning due to the massive increase in 
crude oil prices in the 1970s. It also meant thatthe capacity of the Soviet Union to 
maintain the arms race and rivalry with the West, particularly the United States 
with its far larger economy, became too onerous to be sustained any longer. 
Thus the decision by Gorbachev to abandon class struggle as the major 
guiding principle in conducting international relations was essentially a response 
to this reality. The overt military support for revolution in the Third World was no 
longer seen as making any strategic sense to the new reform leaders in the 
Kremlin. This decision had its most immediate ramifications in the Soviet bloc 
in Eastern Europe and took even the most optimistic Western observers by 
surprise. Thus, all these nations were allowed to go their own way. Most managed 
to peacefully remove Communist rulers, despite the existence of tension and 
uncertainty. The only exception was Rumania and, in addition and crucially, the 
post-war division of Germany came to an end. Gorbachev had calculated that the 
gratitude which the West would accord him would translate into tangible economic 
benefits for perestroika. The new Soviet leader also demonstrated a considerable 
disdain for the use of violence as a political weapon and this was to continue as a 
feature of his term as General Secretarv of the CPSF Besides this. the decision bv 
• • J 
President Reagan to escalate the arms race and promote his 'Star \Vars' initiative 
'Nas a threat to which the faltering Soviet economy could not respond . .\foCauley 
illustrates in what a dire state it was: "The official view was that Soviet national 
income was about 64 per cent of the US level in 1988. Gorbachev, in a speech in 
October 1990, implied that the real figure was about 40 per cent. "20 This factor is 
reflected in the sta!mant GNP figures during: 1985-89.21 The arrival of inflation as 
........ ........ ,.__; 
an endemic feature of the last years of the Soviet Union's existence "vas directly 
related to loss of the money supply, whose blame must fall on Gorbachev. The 
=·
1 ~1cCaulcv. The Soviet Union, p.366. 
_,,l > , ...... 
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budget deficit soared from a traditional 2 or 3 per cent of GNP to I 0 per cent in 
1988.22 
Gorbachev, in his own writing on perestroikcl3 even tries to defend the 
achievements of the command economy. He, perhaps correctly, assesses the 
international realities of the late 1920s and entire 1930s. "In effect, we had to build 
up industry, especially heavy industry and the power and machine-building 
industries from scratch. And we set out boldly to accomplish this task. The 
viability of the Party's plans which the masses understood and accepted, and of the 
slogans and projects permeated with the ideological energy of our revolution 
manifested itself in the enthusiasm with which millions of Soviet people joined in 
th~ efforts to build up national industry. "24 The new Soviet leader had hoped he 
could fire up the entire Soviet Union with a radically different vision of how to 
make socialism work This can, in retrospect, be regarded as na1ve as the masses 
had long since come to regard socialism and the CPSU leadership with the utmost 
cynicism. He also paid attention to the reforms which had previously taken place 
in certain nations in the Soviet bloc, such as Hungary where a flourishing 
but limited private sector had been allowed to exist after the 1956 uprising as long 
as no attempt was made to escape the confines of the Warsaw Pact. Also, the 
experiment in democratic reform in Czechoslovakia was now viewed as a positive 
move toward a more democratic socialism than presently existed in the USSR 
Gorbachev assessed the situation which had now come to confront the 
Soviet Union and made, to his mind, perestroika indispensable. He v.'Iites in 1987: 
"Analyzing the situation we first discovered a slowing economic grovvth. In the 
last fifteen years the national income growth rates had declined by more than a 
half and by the beginning of the eighties had fallen to a level close to economic 
stagnation. A country that was quickly closing on the world's advanced nations 
began to lose one position after another."25 Thus the ideological challenge to the 
capitalist world of socialism in its Soviet form was faltering badly. Krushchev's 




crude boast in the late 1950s that the socialist system would bury capitalism was 
now absurd, especially in view of the Soviet Union's stagnant economy. 
Accentuating Gorbachev's predicament, Kotkin indicates how a dramatic fall in 
world oil prices by 69 per cent had a disastrous effect on the Union.26 Gorbachev 
argued on how a preoccupation with producing enormous quantities of particular 
goods, especially the commodities emanating from heavy industry, had not only 
been fruitless but actually detrimental to the Soviet Union's already weak 
competitive position. He describes how "the worker or enterprise that had 
expended the greatest amount of labour, material and money was considered the 
best".27 The loser, he conceded, was the consumer. 
Excessive investments had been placed into sectors such as raw materials, 
energy and other resources with very little to show for it. Gorbachev asserts that 
"our country's wealth in terms of natural and manpower resources has spoilt, one 
may even say corrupted us. That, in fact, is chiefly the reason why it was possible 
for our economy to develop extensively for decades. "18 Kotkin indicates just how 
much it was endowed with natural resources. By the 1970s, " the USSR had risen 
to become the world's largest producer of oil and natural gas, and the third largest 
of coal. but it nonetheless suffered chronic energv shortages - what the leading 
-· _. • .! "-"' \,...o 
expen called a 'crisis amid plenty_ "'29 
Clearly, Gorbachev understood that, in the final decades of the hventieth 
cenn1ry military power - including a vast stockpile of nuclear weapons - counted 
for relatively little. The contradiction with, for example Japan and the ''tiger" 
economies of East Asia was very evident to him. Far more prestige was granted to 
those nations who exported hi-tech goods, panicularly in the IT industry. Besides 
the USSR's relatively underdeveloped consumer industry, the ossified command 
economy produced countless economic distortions. Gorbachev writes: "'An absurd 
situation \Vas developing. The Soviet Union.. the world's biggest producer of steeL 
raw materials, fuel and energy, has shortfalls in them due to wasteful or inefficient 
~c· Kotkin, Armageddon averted, p.16. 
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use. One of the biggest producers of grain for food, it nevertheless has to buy 
millions of tons of grain a year for fodder."3° Certain Soviet achievements, 
particularly in the aeronautic and space industry, had stunned the world, but living 
conditions for most ordinary Soviet citizens were cramped and spartan. 
Agricultural and other consumer goods provided by the so-called developed 
socialism were either frequently unavailable or were of notably inferior quality. 
1.4. The security organs, the suppression of dissidents and the bureaucracy. 
The tendency to secrecy and repression became even more manifest 
with the overthrow of Krushchev in a Party leadership coup in 1964. His 
replacement by Brezhnev resulted in an even more vigorous crackdown on dissent. 
Whilst he did not return to Stalin's rule by terror he nevertheless cracked 
down hard on any dissidents who began to be more organised - their practice of 
publishing samizdat (or self-published) literature being a prime manifestation of 
this development. The KGB was the major instrument of Soviet rulers in 
maintaining their absolute control over society and culture. Kotkin quotes a 
former deputy chairman of this security agency, Filipp Bobkov, as asserting that 
"the KGB was a repressive, not an educational organ".31 He continues: "Many 
people collaborated vvith the authorities' requests without much pressure, and 
more than a few came forward on their own. "32 The KGB saw its major function 
as eradicating all signs of dissent and did not hesitate to use every possible 
•veapon at its disposal to fulfil it. The Party's complete control over society \Vas 
sacrosanct. The creation of the mythical Homo Sovieticus was its supreme goal. 
There existed, not surprisingly, within Soviet society a climate of fear and 
intimidation by and of the KGB and it was an effective tool for most ordinary 
citizens who, had they dissented, feared for their employment, families and the 
very real threat of losing every1hing. The use of imprisonment on charges of 
J•j Gorbachev, Perestroika, new thinking for our countrv and the worlQ, p.21. 





anti-Soviet agitation, the scandalous abuse of psychiatry to intern sane individuals 
and subject them to horrendous treatment with certain dmgs - this tactic broke 
down many people who would normally have withstood persecution - were 
perhaps the KGB' s chief weapons to maintain rigid control. Kotkin again writes: 
"The KGB, like the western media, was obsessed over manifestations of what it 
regarded as non-conformist behaviour. But of the several thousand individuals 
jailed or exiled for unorthodox views or actions during the Brezhnev years, only a 
small minority consisted of internationally recognised human-rights campaigners 
such as the physicist Andrei Sakharov."33 
ft is within this legacy of totalitarian control and despite its relentless 
intensity that Gorbachev launched glasnost or openness. This new policy was 
conceived as essential if the Soviet economy was to be rescued from its terminal 
decline to collapse and, ultimately, to be a relic of twentieth century history. The 
new General Secretary was keenly aware that there were considerable advantages 
in encouraging public criticism of an ossified, unpopular bureaucracy which had 
come to regard the masses with disdain and whose officials were intent on keeping 
their privileges. Glasnost also exposed certain uncomfortable realities of just what 
everyday life in the Soviet Union had been and still remained. "Direct access to 
life in the West was granted only to select members of the Soviet upper ranks. No 
less restricted was access to the lives of those higher strata. Elite hospitals, resorts, 
supply networks and schools were closed affairs."34 He continues, observing that 
"Russia's socialist revolution, having originated in a radical quest for 
egalitarianism, produced an insulated privileged class increasingly preoccupied 
with the spoils of office for themselves and their children. The existence of a 
vast and self-indulgent elite was the greatest contradiction in the post-war Soviet 
Union, and the most volatile. "35 
David Satter writes of the deeply felt dilemma facing the ordinary Soviet 
citizen. Those citizens who felt cheated by the authorities sometimes took their 
complaints to Moscow in person in a vain attempt to obtain redress. They were 
34 Ibid., p.48. 
35 Ibid. 
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termed truth seekers, by Moscow residents, a tenn employed by Satter. The author 
observes that "when a complainant leaves a provincial city to seek truth in 
Moscow, he is taking a path littered with the discarded hopes of thousands of truth 
seekers before him."36 Their treatment by an uncaring bureaucracy involved being 
directed from one reception hall to another and being required to fill out a 
multitude of detailed forms. They, however, still maintained a naive belief in the 
prospects for redress of their grievances. Satter declares that "they are the firmest 
believers in the justice of the Soviet system, which actually has no place for 
them_n37 The general cynicism of the apparat was, however, increasingly made 
evident by glaimost and considerable hopes were aroused that at least some change 
was possible. [n time, glasnost could only serve to undermine faith in a system 
whose economy failed to even provide adequately for its citizens and where the 
apparent universal truths of building a classless society, as conceived by Marx and 
Lenin, were openly mocked by officialdom and their leaders. Strayer refers to the 
existence of a second economy, particularly during the Brezhnev years. This 
enabled the masses to acquire scarce consumer goods which were not available in 
the state sector.38 He remarks on its effect: ''But the price was rampant official 
corruption. The multiple payoffs, favors and personal connections among 
economic managers, some elements of the party apparatus, and large-scale 
operators in the second economy gave rise to the 'mafias' that entrenched 
themselves first in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan and later throughout the 
country."39 Strayer does assert that "accurate figures are impossible to obtain".40 
The realisation was to dawn on most Soviet people that so-called bourgeois 
criticism from the West was actually often correct and that a vigorous open debate 
actually uncovered the sad reality of their Jives. Thus, the allegations that there 
remained thousands of political prisoners even in the 1980s, that much cruelty was 
meted out to them, and that the abuse of psychiatry on a routine basis was indeed 
:•;; Satter, Age of delirium.. p. 91. 
37 Ibid.,p. 92 
38 Strayer, Wnv did the Soviet Union collapse?. p.67. 
39 Ibid . 
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true and not merely Western propaganda, greatly shook any remaining faith in 
communism among the masses. 
1.5. The multi-national character of the Soviet Union. 
Besides the Soviet Union's "outer empire" in Eastern Europe, there remained the 
"inner empire" which included the fifteen constituent republics of the USSR and 
countless smaller nationalities, such as Chechens and Crimean Tartars. This 
heterogeneous character of the Soviet state proved to be an essential structural 
weakness and scarcely disguised the reality that the Communist Party had merely 
constructed the world's first socialist state on the legacy of the Tsarist empire. 
Much propaganda concerning the fraternal brotherhood of the various nations of 
the USSR could not conceal that the Russians were the dominant nationality or 
primus inter pares. Of the estimated 286 million Soviet citizens, scarcely more 
than half that total, 145 million, in 198941 were ethnic Russians. Thus, its 
demographic significance was not overwhelming and, added to this factor, was 
the fact that these Russians were extremely thinly spread in such a vast geographic 
region which encompassed one sixth of the land mass of the planet. 
When ethnic Slavs were encouraged by the Soviet leadership, particularly 
by Stalin, Krushchev and Brezhnev, to migrate to regions such as Central Asia, 
Siberia and the Baltic, this only aggravated matters. McCauley remarks: "The 
concept of the 'Soviet people' was officially promoted from the early 1970s."A2 He 
continues: "Russians continued to take precedence among the nations of the 
Soviet Union. Brezhnev lauded the 'revolutionary energy, diligence and deep 
internationalism of the great Russian people' which had earned them the 'sincere 
respect of the peoples' of the USSR "43 The reason for this internal migration was 
to ostensibly promote economic advancement, particularly industrialisation, but 
most indigenous nationalities perceived it as an act of colonisation, with the real 
41 McCauley, The Soviet Union 1917-1991, p.306. 
42 lbid., p.307. 
43 lbid. 
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aim being to tie them closer to Moscow. Therefore, the other potentially major 
flaw in the structure of the USSR was its multi-national character. Besides the 
numerically dominant Russians there were two other Slavic peoples, the 
Ukrainians and Byelorussians. Ukraine had an estimated population of 44 million 
and Byelorussia had 10 million in 1989.44 Their demographic weight alone meant 
their aspirations could not be permanently ignored. This factor was also reinforced 
by their high level of cultural development. Many Slavophile propagandists were 
very keen to include these nations within the framework of a greater Russia as they 
had long shared a common history and culture. Stalin had caused the deaths of 
millions of Ukrainians during collectivisation- there had been a deliberate man -
maqe famine, and the dictator had viewed them as collaborators with the invading 
Germans during the 1940s. Their sheer numbers protected them from the fate 
meted out to smaller groups such as the Crimean Tartars or Volga Germans who 
had suffered a brutal deportation to Central Asia. Ukraine possessed a nationalistic 
western section close to the border with Poland, which included a number of 
Eastern-rite Catholics, and a more industrialised east which included 
approximately 11 million ethnic Russians. This latter population was, not 
surprisingly, more content to remain in the USSR. Once Gorbachev introduced 
glasnost as official policy, nationalist tendencies emerged and even led to the 
founding of Rukh, the Ukraine's popular front. Independence was not viewed as a 
realistic aspiration, however. 
The nvo most troublesome regions within the Union were the Baltic states 
(Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), and the nations of the Transcaucasus (Armenia, 
.. Azerbaijan and Georgia). The former three states had, between the two World 
Wars, been independent but had been consigned to the Soviet Union by the 
Molotov-Ribbentropp pact of 1939. Stalin had invaded and annexed them 
immediately and granted them the status of republics within the USSR. These three 
Baltic nations chafed under the Soviet yoke and had powerful memories of an 
independence so brutally snatched from them. They constituted the most western-
oriented region of the Union and perceived themselves to be more a part of Europe 
44 lbid., p.306. 
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than of Russia. Whilst Stalin's successors had allowed benign manifestations of 
national pride, particularly in the cultural arena, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
advent of gla~nost would revive the demand for a restoration of independence. 
In the Transcaucasus, Armenia and Georgia were both ancient Christian 
nations while Azerbaijan was Islamic. All three republics had developed a 
reputation for corruption, as previously alluded to, particularly in the Brezhnev era. 
There was a major dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan dating back to early 
Soviet days over the Armenian enclave ofNagorno-Karabakh, which lay within 
the borders of the Azerbaijan republic. It had been, in the early 1920s, decided to 
award control of the enclave to the Azeris. This ruling had never been accepted by 
Armenia. The dispute arising out of the resurfacing of this quarrel became a major 
crisis for Gorbachev. The third republic, Georgia, remained fiercely committed to 
its language and culture despite overt attempts at Russification by the authorities. 
Strayer points to the 1978 decision by the Party to abolish Georgian as the official 
language of the republic in favour of Russian. The consequence was that it 
"provoked such a widespread outcry that authorities were forced to back down on 
the issue."45 But the events were restricted to the relatively narrow field of 
language and culture. The possibility of independence was seldom considered as a 
realistic aspiration. 
The other major region of the USSR was Central Asia. It was traditionally 
Islamic and nomadic in character. Here, tribal and clan loyalties counted most and 
it was the most back-ward region with by far the highest birth rate. An example of 
this is Tadzhikistan where the percentage increase in population was 3 5. 7 in 1970-
79 compared with a mere 6.5 per cent among Russians.46 It also could be 
viewed as being stuck in a colonial relationship with the Slavic core of the empire 
and its economy \Vas based heavily on cotton cultivation for the wider USSR. 
Also, the region had witnessed the influx of several million Russian settlers \vhose 
function had been to modernise such a backward region and thev were settled 
~ -' 
chiefly in the urban centres. 
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Strayer accurately summarises the nationality problem prior to the advent 
of Gorbachev. He writes: "Thus, the Soviet Union endured, its political stability 
not seriously threatened by nationalist upheaval. "47 He remarks on the provision 
of educational advancement for backward peoples in a country or empire 
industrialising, albeit at a snail's pace. The leadership's authority would have 
been reinforced by the "constant propaganda by the regime and few alternative 
sources of information. "48 But, he concludes: "But beneath the placid surface, 
the slow transformation of cultural identity and political identity proceeded apace, 
driven in large measure by the policies and practices of the Soviet regime itself.."49 
Reform was to greatly accelerate these processes and bring the inherent 
contradictions of Soviet political and economic life to the fore. 
1.6. A brief biographical portraval of Gorbachev. 
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was born in the village of Privolnoye in the rural 
region of Stavropol in southern Russia in 1931. His family was of peasant origins 
but both his father and grandfather were party members and, as a young man he 
had been very active in the party's youth wing, the Komsomol. By the age of 
eighteen he had become a candidate member of the CPSU itself, and he proceeded 
to study law at Moscow State University. His decision to make a career in the 
Party in 1955, on returning to Stavropol, was to govern his life for 36 years, and 
by 1970, he had risen to being first secretary in the provincial party bureaucracy. 
He \vas transferred to Moscow in 1978, being appointed to the party secretariat 
with responsibility for agriculture. In 1980 he became a full member of the party's 
Politburo and, at the age of 49 years, he was the youngest. The deaths in oftice of 
the gerontocracy who had headed the CPSU propelled him to being General 
Secretary of the Communist Party in 1985, at a relatively young age of 54. 
Coleman observes that "like everyone else who grew up in Stalin's Russia, 
Gorbachev learned very early to keep his innermost thoughts to himself'. 50 He 




enthusiastically supported the Stalinist line of the period but clearly was not 
blind to the tragic consequences of the terror. He resolved to work within the party 
"'where al I the power lay, rather than to tilt uselessly at windmills outside it". 51 
Strayer observes that "his early career co-incided with the Krushchev thaw and 
marked his break with Stalinism and his political identification with the moderate, 
reformist wing of the party". 52 
Once securely ensconced in Moscow in 1978 he had been exposed to see 
"the party's leadership in its most decrepit, unimaginative, and incompetent phase, 
particularly during Brezhnev's last years". 53 The brief tenure of Chernenko (1984-
85) only confirmed what a fellow reformer agreed: "everything is rotten"54 and 
also "its no longer possible to live this way" 55 Only Andropov's brief period in 
power(l 982-84) "provided Gorbachev with a more positive model for many of 
his own early reforms". 56 These included worker indiscipline, anticorruption 
drives, and a crackdown on alcoholism. 
Clearly, little in Gorbachev's background would have prepared him for 
steering the Soviet Union on a path which was to lead to credible experiments in 
democracy and the abandonment of socialism in favour of the market. He became 
the most significant figure of the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
~0 Coleman, The decline and fall of the Soviet empire, p.218. 
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CHAPTER2 
Gla5nost and the disintegration of th~. Soviet state 
2.1 Glasnost and political change 
The significance of glasnost in relation to the emergence of criticism of Soviet 
politics and society cannot be over-estimated. The endemic corruption of the 
Brezhnev years had also been accompanied by the constant crushing of all forms 
of dissent with dissidents of all shades of ideological opinion being routinely 
harassed, imprisoned, exiled and even confined to psychiatric institutions. Any 
belief among the working people of the Soviet Union in Marxism-Leninism had 
long since dissipated and it is not an exaggeration to say that the whole system 
enjoyed little legitimacy among the masses. 
Realising what he had inherited Gorbachev aimed at revitalising and 
reenergising Soviet society and it was thus that he announced to his people and 
the Soviet hierarchy that he was introducing a policy of glasnost, which means 
openness. Whilst there was considerable skepticism among observers at the time 
it soon became apparent that a significant shift in the political dynamics of the 
USSR was taking place. The encouragement to the press to openly criticise the 
dysfunctional elements in Soviet society and its economy was a startling move 
away from previous practices. What was the legacy which Gorbachev had 
inherited from his predecessors and, more particularly, how could he tackle the 
ghost of Stalin who had dictated both the nature of the Soviet command economy 
and the construction of a 'totalitarian' political system and the society which it 
produced? The ideology of Marxism-Leninism supplied the rationalisation for the 
suspension of even the most elementary of civil liberties, giving rise to a climate 
of rampant fear of the authorities. Since the Communist Party allowed no 
alternative party to function, an unreal world of lies developed in which only the 
ritualistic praising of Soviet achievements (in science in particular, but also in 
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practically all fields of human endeavour) was permitted to exist. The scornful 
denunciation of Western capitalist societies was the norm and any self-criticism 
of Soviet society and economy was crushed by the unrelenting propaganda 
machine of the Party. 
The effect of this world of self-delusion could not be concealed 
permanently in the economic arena. Gorbachev's immediate predecessors 
(particularly Leonid Brezhnev) were content to allow the economy to tick over 
but by the late 1970s and early 1980s the signs of the terminal decline of the 
Soviet economy were plain for all serious observers, both Western and Soviet, to 
note. Political repression would not resuscitate the empire of the Soviet Union and 
Gorbachev decided, at first tentatively, to attempt to harness the energies of the 
long-suffering masses through greater openness and democracy, to gain a better 
life for his people. 
No incident more thoroughly indicated the intent of the new leadership to 
be more honest and informative to its citizens than the official handling of what 
became known as the Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster in April 1986. Archie 
Brown observes that "in a paradoxical way, the disastrous accident ....... was a 
stimulus to the further development of glasnost. The paradox lay in the fact that 
the initial Soviet reaction was a complete negation of glasnost and an apparent 
return to the bad old ways."1Whilst the accident occurred on 26 April 1986 it was 
only two days later that it was publicly confirmed on Soviet television. The fact 
that radioactive fallout had spread over Western Europe and Scandinavia meant 
that no attempt at sweeping the matter under the carpet could succeed. Brown 
analyses the subsequent response and comments that "the bolder Soviet 
journalists drew lessons from the catalogue of irresponsibility the Chernobyl 
disaster embodied".2 In 1991 Gorbachev was to observe that "this event shook us 
immensely and agreed that it was a turning point in terms of the development of 
greater openness". 3 
1 Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p.163. 
2 Ibid., p.163. 
3 Ibid. 
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Brian McNair comments on how the struggle between the proponents of 
greater openness and those who demanded a reversion to the old responses 
occurred. "Gorbachev and Vorotnikov are said to have been in the minority in 
advocating a more open approach to the tragedy .... The majority favoured a news 
blackout.''4 By 6 May the supporters of glasnost had prevailed. The significance 
of the Chernobyl disaster cannot be overemphasised. McNair quotes Soviet 
sociologist Boris Kagarlitsky as asserting that, after Chernobyl "glasnost began 
to change from an official slogan into an everyday practice."5 lts impact went far 
and wide. He writes that "the truth about Chernobyl which eventually hit the 
newspapers opened the way to a more truthful examination of other social 
problems".6 
Glasnost could not have been implemented without the thoroughgoing 
reforms which took place at the top echelons of the Soviet Communist Party 
and the transformation of the leadership .. John Miller remarks on the drastic nature 
of the changes. '"By the time of the XXVIl Party congress in February, 1986 about 
40 per cent of the most senior jobs in the country had changed hands."7 The 
implications of this for glasnost were dramatic, with deleted or suppressed events 
in the Soviet past being publicly revealed and discussed. Thus the Stalin years 
were reassessed by journals and periodicals and even the very nature of what 
constituted Soviet socialism and the command economy were open for discussion. 
Yet another effect of the Chernobyl catastrophe was evident in the actions 
taken by prominent reformer and major architect of glmmost, Alexander 
Yakovlev, to overhaul "some parts of the media"8. Thus, major newspapers, inter 
alia lzvestiya and Literatumaya Gazeta, were given new editors and no longer 
served merely as the mouthpieces of official propaganda. 
The overt wooing of the country's intelligentsia was viewed as crucial in 
reforming Soviet socialism. This was graphically illustrated when Gorbachev 
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phoned Andrei Sakharov, the USSR's most prominent dissident, on 16 December 
1986, and invited him to return to Moscow from his forced exile in Gorky. 
Gorbachev's sincerity as a reformer of the Soviet economy and society was no 
longer doubted by analysts and observers. 
Glasnost was seen as crucial by the reformist leaders in implementing 
that other pillar of reform, perestroika. These two concepts can be viewed as two 
sides of the same coin with the latter slogan aiming at the revitalisation and 
modernisation of the Soviet economy. The enthusiastic participation of all strata 
of society - intellectuals, managers and workers especially - was avidly sought to 
ensure the success of the changes. The grim state of the Soviet economy, based as 
it was on the Stalinist command structure, had reached the level of terminal 
decline. Much of the reality of this had been camouflaged by both relentless 
propaganda and the alienation of civil society. The whole question of the need for 
radical structural reform or perestroika will be examined in detail in Chapter 3 of 
this dissertation, but it must be stressed that glasnost was an integral part of 
achieving this wider goal. 
Brown emphasises that Gorbachev was, from 1985 to 1986, "clearing the 
ground for reform"9 and he further points out that "by 1986 he was moving 
towards giving priority to political over economic reform, not only because he 
believed that the former was a precondition of the latter but also because he 
thought liberalization and a broadening of the scope of political activity of 
existing partially moribund organizations, such as soviets and party committees 
(as distinct from the professional apparat \.Vhich had usurped many of their 
powers) were desirable aims in themselves". 10 
The period of 1987-88 was "one of radical political reform" 11 At the 
plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in January 1987, Gorbachev emphasised 
the need for democratisation. He decried the debilitating effects which Stalinism 
~ McCauley, Gorbachev, p.M. 
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had on political thinking and argued this situation "had remained largely fixed ~at 
the level of the 1930s-1940s' when 'vigorous debates and creative ideas 
disappeared ...... while authoritarian evaluations and opinions became 
unquestionable truths"'. 12 The Party leader's initially tentative and increasingly 
revisionist approach was to lead to greater democracy in the succeeding four 
years. He asserted that "perestroika itself is possible only through democracy 
and due to democracy. It is only in this way that it is possible to give scope to 
socialism's most powerful creative force - free labour and free thought in a free 
country."13 
Walter Laquer observed that "' glasnost has opened one of the most 
fascinating chapters in Russian cultural history and, to a lesser extent, in Soviet 
society". 14 It must be noted that this author was writing in 1990 prior to the 
collapse of the entire Soviet edifice. Laquer was in no doubt that Gorbachev's 
brave policies were to have a dramatic impact on the politics, economy and 
society of the USSR. He pays particular attention to the dynamic effect of the 
unleashing of glasnost in the cultural sphere. "Under glasnost, complaints about 
many aspects of Soviet life have been voiced in a way that was unthinkable even 
a few years ago."15 The removal ofrestrictions on cultural activities such as the 
publication of books, performance of plays and cinema films, and the exhibition 
of previously prohibited paintings and sculptures certainly made intellectual life 
more exhilarating and invigorating. Of considerable interest to academic 
researchers was the freedom given to Soviet sociologists to approach academic 
disciplines in a more empirical manner, rather than merely adhering slavishly to 
the constricting confines of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Thus, various aspects of 
life in the Soviet Union. such as the position of women in society and their 
difficult economic role, were examined in a more Western methodological 
manner. Laquer declares that "the decision to launch the glasnost campaign 'vvas a 




courageous one". 16 Social evils previously regarded as unique to the capitalist 
world such as the astonishingly high rate of divorce, prostitution, alcoholism and 
a serious drug problem suddenly came under the spotlight of public discussion. 
Knowledge of the serious shortcomings of daily life was to have a direct effect on 
the stability of the Communist order and system, as the image previously 
propagated was demonstrably shown to be largely fictitious. 
There could not but be a backlash from the entrenched right-wing forces 
who had much to lose from what glasnost was exposing. These forces consisted 
of both those committed to the Soviet model of socialism who were hostile to the 
changes which Gorbachev was implementing and also the bureaucratic strata, 
who numbered in the millions and had enjoyed both life-time security and a 
multitude of perks and privileges. Constant opposition from within the Party 
leadership's conservative faction whose most prominent spokesman was Ygor 
Ligachev, did provide a brake to Gorbachev's ambitions. The so-called 'Nina 
Andreeva' affair illustrates this. This involved a lengthy letter to the newspaper 
Sovetskaya Rossiya on 13 March 1988 from what was purported to be an obscure 
lecturer at a Leningrad technical institute. This letter denounced any critical 
analysis of the Stalinist legacy as a betrayal of both the Marxist-Leninist 
revolutionary founders of the Soviet Union and the 'heroic' efforts of Stalin and 
earlier generations to construct a developed socialist state during the 1930s and 
1940s. It certainly served as a reminder that conservative forces which desired a 
return to the status quo ante were still able to make a direct assault on glasnost 
and on Gorbachev and his team ofreformers. Brown observes that Andreeva's 
anger at "the growing tendency to fill in the 'blank spots' in Soviet history with 
what to the detached observer were objective facts but which she interpreted as a 
denigration of a mainly heroic Soviet pasf'17 was expressed in a manner which 
occasioned temporary panic on the part of the reformers. Conditioned by their 
life-long experience of Soviet political reality, they interpreted the Andreeva letter 
as an indication of a change in the balance of power in favour of conservative 
17 Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p.172. 
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anti-reform factions within the CPSU Politburo, backed by the KGB and military. 
The expectation was that reforms would be reversed by these hardline agencies 
and the individuals who headed them. The 'Moscow spring', it appeared, was 
over. The intelligentsia, particularly journalists and enthusiastic reformers within 
elements of the Party were temporarily cowed into silence. Years of blind 
obedience to authority had resulted in apathy and many observers were 
anticipating a conservative backlash. 
Brown describes the 'Nina Andreeva' episode "as an attack on the main 
thrust of Gorbachev' s reforms and a plea to tum the clock back to the political 
practices and ideological beliefs characteristic of the unreformed Soviet 
system". 18 The response among most sectors of Soviet society- from intellectuals 
to ordinary workers - to the letter was that it was correctly suspected of being 
authorised and written with the full blessing of conservative leaders and that it 
was not merely the views of an obscure Leningrad teacher. It was true that the 
letter had strong support within certain sections of the CPSU leadership and the 
time of its publication in Sovetskaya Rossiya was well chosen. The absence of 
both Gorbachev and his closest ally Yakovlev from the country temporarily 
"strengthened the view of reformist intellectuals that there had been a change of 
Party line". 19 Gorbachev' steam insisted on an unsigned response being printed in 
Pravda on 5 April 1988 in which the Andreeva letter was roundly attacked and 
condemned. The reformist wing thus remained in control although Brown 
comments on how fragile support for democratic change in general and glasnost 
in particular remained. Thus, the incident showed that reform "still depended -
three years after his coming to power - on Gorbachev and how little reliance could 
be placed at this time on democratic pressure from below to combat attempts by 
party conservatives to launch a counter-reformation".20 John Miller describes the 
'Nina Andreeva affair' as "a frightening episode, showing the fragility of glasnost 
so long as it was not anchored in a bedrock of rights". 21 .The institution of 
19 Ibid. p.173. 
20 Ibid, p.174. 
21 Miller, Mikhail Gorbachev and the end of Soviet power, p. 98 
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important "democratic" structures in the late 1980s and early 1990s - particularly 
the Congress of People's Deputies and the indirect election of Gorbachev as 
executive President of the USSR - laid the structural foundation for defeating the 
coup plotters of 19-21August1991- The establishment of the Congress, whilst 
being flawed in terms of a Western concept of democracy, was a brave venture, 
in giving the long suppressed people of this sprawling empire a taste of holding 
public leaders accountable. As an indirect consequence of this, a new mood on the 
part of the populatio~ including the intelligentsia, workers and previously cowed 
ordinary citizens, was to see the attempt at reverting to communism fail. They had 
come to value their new freedoms. The decision to elevate Gorbachev to the 
Executive Presidency of the Soviet Union was aimed at supplying him with a 
legitimate basis of power that was located outside the Party. Previously, the 
General Secretary of the CPSU had automatically been the most powerful 
individual in the USS~ essentially a hangover from Stalin's time where all 
political control had been accumulated by him in his role as dictator. It is crucial 
to note that Gorbachev chose to be indirectly elected by the Congress of People's 
Deputies rather than seeking a popular mandate from the Soviet electorate. The 
reason for this lay in the insecurity which Gorbachev felt, particularly as he 
witnessed the rapidly growing popularity of Boris Yeltsin. In addition, the decline 
of the Soviet economy in the late 1980s had made him unpopular with certain 
segments of Soviet society and he regarded the cautious indirect approach to be 
the most prudent one. Of enormous significance was the election of his bitter rival 
Yeltsin, in June 1991, as President of the Russian Federation by the direct votes of 
universal adult suffrage of its people. This was to provide Yeltsin with a major 
base from which to oust Gorbachev from his position of authority following the 
demise of the USSR. 
l 989-90 was to witness the removal of Article 6 of the Soviet 
Constitution, vitally relevant for the progressive development ofgla.most. lt 
stated: ""The leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its 
political system, of all state organisations and public organisations is the 
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Communist Party of the Soviet Union."22 Glasnost had evolved to the extent 
where competitive politics were tolerated and even encouraged at the highest 
level of the Party itself. Since the October revolution of 1917 the CPSU had held 
a constitutionally guaranteed monopoly on all political power - its so-called 
leading role - and this had prevented any attempt at organised opposition 
operating against it. The demands for the removal of similar clauses in the 
satellite states of Eastern Europe had featured prominently in the 'people's 
power' or 'velvet revolutions' which had swept away Communist rule in these 
nations. Gorbachev now realised that democratisation had developed to such a 
degree that Article 6 was essentially an anachronism. Miller observes that the 
disestablishment of the CPSU "was presented as a free and considered decision 
for which the Party thought the time was ripe". 23 The Party retained its property 
and its political appointees did not lose their jobs. " Everything was done to 
minimise disruption, confrontation and humiliation, and at the same time to 
counter any impression that he [Gorbachev] was the Party's hostage."24 
Robert V. Daniels notes that by the time of the All-Union Party congress 
in July 1990 the conservative delegates who constituted a majority were "now 
demoralized".25 In Gorbachev's 'Report to the 28th Congress' he painted a 
glowing picture of the onward march of democracy : ''The political system is 
being radically transformed; genuine democracy is being established, with free 
elections, a multi-party system, and human rights; and real people's power is 
being revived .... The atmosphere of ideological diktat has been replaced by free 
thinking, glasnost, and the openness of society to information."26 
However, all attempts to limit the effect of glasnost in creating a genuine 
public opinion would prove to be fruitless. The Congress of People's Deputies 
was to result in a rapid removal of fear on the part of the masses in speaking their 
minds on political and economic issues. By reserving seats in the new Congress 
those in power, including Gorbachev, believed they could control glasnost. "It 
22 Ibid, p.135. 
23 Ibid 
24 Ibid. 
25 Robert V Daniels, The end of the Communist Revolution, (London, Routledge, 1993), p.39. 
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was a fundamental error"27, writes Coleman. "Once given the power to say no, 
the Soviet people would no longer be satisfied with partial reform granted from 
the top down. They would press to extend the limited franchise Gorbachev had 
given them until pressure from the bottom up became the dominant political 
force in Russia. ultimately that force would break up the U.S.S.R."28 
2.2 The struggle for a civil societv 
The response of those forces which were ranged against Gorbachev, especially the 
organs of state power such as the KGB (the security and intelligence services) 
and the armed forces \Vith their gigantic military-industrial complex, will now be 
analysed. The entire history of both pre-revolutionary Russia and the Soviet 
Union militated against the successful democratisation of the country. Besides the 
army and KGB, there was also active opposition from ideological conservatives 
and the obstructive activities of the bureaucracy. The impending loss of total 
power and privileges meant that many people were immensely threatened by the 
new openness. 
Baruch A Hazan argues that "gla.most was the aspect of perestroika that 
affected the KGB more than any other"29 organ of state. whether military or 
civilian. It is not difilcult to see why this should have been so. The KGB had been 
created since the revolution (under various names such as the Cheka, MVD and 
OGPU) with the specific purpose of liquidating opponents of the Soviet 
government The reality \vas that operating in secret had always been fundamental 
to its existence and function. The Stalin years (from Lenin's death in 1924 to the 
demise of the dictator in 19 5 3) had been an era where mass terror against his 
opponents and other "class enemies' had been conducted in its very name. Even 
during the Gorbachev period the KGB continued to possess an absolute minefield 
of information on sociaL political and economic life in the USSR. The KGB was 
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information monopoly. Thus, the public exposure of the sinister methods of 
dealing with dissidents (especially their confinement to mental hospitals and the 
rampant abuse of psychiatry) would only confirm the truth about what had 
previously been denounced as anti-Soviet slanders in the Western press. With the 
increasing revelations which glasnost brought about, the evidence of illegal 
arrests of individuals, the fabrication of cases against opponents and, most 
humiliating of all, the exposure of the widespread corruption within its ranks, 
saw the KGB' s previous elite status came under direct threat. Hazan asserts that 
"glasnost was clearly causing pain to the KGB. There seemed to be no end to the 
spate of revelations of KGB and MVD abuses and corruption."30 Besides its 
penchant for corruption and illegalities, "entire aspects of its activities came to be 
questioned"31 as a consequence of glasnost. Hazan quotes S. Pestov in an article 
entitled "In Moscow Everything is Secret." This author alluded to a huge 
"information vacuum" and argued for "a review of the instructions and directives 
that rest1ict the flow of information in the USSR".32 The masses needed to have 
widespread access to what really was happening in the USSR and it is significant 
that by early 1988 the KGB chiefs in five Soviet republics, together with lesser 
officials were dismissed. 33 KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov mounted a campaign to 
discredit glasnost arguing that only Western class enemies were benefiting from 
the undermining of the KGB's status and position. Thus, in a speech on 13 April 
1988, in which he ritualistically credited "democracy and glasnost" for its role in 
"creating most favourable conditions for developing the initiative and creativity of 
the broad masses of working people"34, he managed to contradict himself. He 
accused glasnost of causing "social demagoguery"35 and "substituting bourgeois 
liberalism for the essence of the concept of socialist democracy" 36 Because of his 
thinly disguised hostility to refonn, Gorbachev decided to remove him from his 
29 Baruch A Hazan, Gorbachev and his enemies, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1990), p.151. 
30 Ibid., p.153. 
31 Ibid. 
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post as KGB chief at the Central Committee plenum of 19-20 September 1989. 
He was replaced by Vladimir Kryuchkov, who proved to be a bad choice, as he 
was to be involved in the 1991 coup attempt. 
During Gorbachev's first four years at the helm his major opponent was 
identified as Ygor Ligachev. Although the latter supported perestroika in 
principle he was very critical both of the liberalising trends of glasnost and the 
advance of a creeping capitalism. Gorbachev skillfully placed himself between 
Ligachev, the conservative, and Yeltsin, the liberal. 
Gorbachev seized his opportunity to act decisively against his 
conservative opponents at the September 1988 plenum of the CPSU. Coleman 
identifies his main achievements: "Andrei Gromyko and three other Brezhnev 
era holdovers on the Politburo were eased into retirement. Conservatives left on 
the ruling body were first weakened numerically by the forced retirement of the 
Brezhnev old guard, then weakened further when their job responsibilities were 
dm.vngraded."37 Ligachev \Vas relieved of his position in charge of ideology and 
KGB chief Chebrikov was deprived of his powerful position and replaced, as 
mentioned, in 1989, by Kryuchkov. Gorbachev also replaced conservatives on the 
Politburo with more progressive appointments, such as Vadim Medvedev who 
took over Ligachev's role and status. Finally, Gorbachev added the Presidency to 
his position as General Secretary of the CPSlJ, thus supplying himself with a 
constitutional power base independent of the Communist Party 38 Coleman makes 
this observation on Gorbachev: "The September 1988 plenum was a milestone in 
another way. lt also revealed a new political tactic that Gorbachev would now 
follow. As public support for perestroika, and for Mikhail Sergeyevich 
personally, declined across the country, he would compensate by taking on 
increased political power for himself "39 
Glasnost among the political elite \Vas articulated as being, in essence, 
democratisation. The election of a new parliamentary body, the Congress of 
Peoples' Deputies was vital to this goal and Gorbachev strengthened his ov.n 
r Coleman. The decline and fall of the SO\iet Union, p.239. 
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status by forcing through legislation giving the President real powers. Coleman 
observes: "These changes which he successfully rammed through, would 
revolutionize the nation's political system, and it goes without saying, 
substantially increase Gorbachev's own authority.'>4° Strayer remarks concerning 
glasnost and the relationship of the masses with it: "Clearly it fostered a wave of 
hope, particularly among the intelligentsia and professional groups, that life ~ould 
now be different and that their country might finally become 'normal', which 
was to say, westem."41 
That Gorbachev was undertaking a particularly risky strategy which 
certain vested interests were to be hostile to was always in his political 
calculations. Conservative hardliners (although weakened), the KGB and the 
military could mount a strong establishment backlash to reform. The military 
had its O\\tn priorities and was horrified by the loss of Eastern Europe in 1989. 
Gorbachev did have the factor of being the Party's leader and it had a tradition of 
not intervening in civilian affairs. Kotkin wTites: "Having deliberately crippled 
the centralized party machine, Gorbachev retained control over the executive 
pillars of the Soviet state: the KGB and interior ministry (MVD), whose 
'republic' branches were totally subordinated to Moscow, and the unified Soviet 
army". 42 The military, though immensely powerful and possessing an enormous 
stockpile of nuclear weapons, \Vas not a very helpful instrument in suppressing 
dissent Kotkin illustrates this dilemma: "'The difficulties of using the army 
domestically were made plain in April 1989, when a few hundred demonstrators 
in the Georgian capitaL some advocating independence, were violently dispersed. 
resulting in around t\venty deaths, an incident that threatened to ignite the entire 
Georgian nation. As everyday political instruments, the KGB, the .\:1VD, and the 
army were no substitute for the party. Their use, moreover, was now subject to 
debate in the revamped Soviet parliament as well as in the republic legislatures.' .... u 
The Soviet Union's geo-strategic position had been transformed overnight by 
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the renunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine. Two factors contributed to Gorbachev 
maintaining his leadership position in the light of these events. Firstly, his skill 
as a political tactician and, secondly, the dramatic effect of glasnost in creating 
a new public opinion which could no longer be disregarded. This latter reality 
allowed him to outmanoeuvre the conservatives and greatly strengthened his 
capacity to achieve what Coleman terms "reform from the bottom up'"'4 during 
1989-1990. The public televising of the proceedings of the new Congress of 
People's Deputies allowed open criticism of past and present Soviet leaders and 
their policies to be laid bare for public scrutiny. This was revolutionary and had 
a dramatic effect of freeing the ordinary individual from pervasive fear. The pace 
and goals of reform was greatly accelerated, with the removal of Article 6 of 
the Soviet constitution which had guaranteed the CPSU its leading role, being 
abolished, with Gorbachev's blessing in 1990. 
Hazan also differentiates between the forces which were arrayed against 
glasnost. He identifies two major factions, each striving to undermine Gorbachev. 
These consisted of the conservative ideological opposition who were horrified by 
the heretical deviations from the established Party orthodoxy, and those members 
of the bureaucracy who were fearful that their privileged status and position was 
being rapidly eroded and undermined. The author illustrates the different 
strategies employed in combating the reforms. Regarding the conservatives, he 
asserts that "unlike the bureaucrats, they do not enjoy the camouflaging 
anonymity provided by 'the ministry', 'the committee' and so forth. Indeed they 
do not seek the anonymity provided by the rank-and-file bureaucrats, for one of 
their main goals is to obtain wide publicity for their aims.'"'5 Their hostility was 
directed at both glasnost and perestroika. Hazan continues: "In addition, 
whereas the bureaucrats outwardly subscribe to perestroika yet try to 
obstruct its detailed implementation in practical ways by simply continuing to 
perform their jobs in the old way, the conservatives prefer to present their claims 
in terms of serving the party and state. ,,4{; He concludes: "Moreover, the ultimate 
44 Coleman, The decline and fall of the Soviet empire, pp.244-271. 
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goal of their activity is beyond any doubt: to prevent glasnost and 
democratization, if necessary by ousting Gorbachev himself "47 A crucial factor 
which must not be overlooked is that both communism and the Soviet regime had 
long since lost its legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects. The complete divergence 
between theory and reality could only be maintained by an ever vigilant and all 
intrusive security organ such as the KGB. Also, the absolute control of the 
sources of public information, such as newspapers, radio and television, was a 
distinguishing feature of this kind of totalitarianism. The complete subjugation of 
the nation's culture to an all embracing ideological censorship had long since 
been stoically accepted by the masses as an aspect oflif e over which they had no 
control. Thus, Walter Laquer \\'rites that "the impact of glasnost has been felt 
most palpably in the cultural field. The year 1987 was the annus mirabilis of 
Soviet literature, witnessing not just a second thaw but a true cultural 
blossoming, released (or almost released) from the frigid grasp of censorship. It 
was a time of enormous spiritual ferment and creative openness, of a kind and an 
extent not knmvn for six decades. "48 
After a hesitant beginning in 1985-86, all fields of culture began to foel 
the liberating winds of glasnost. Brian McKair analyses the period of the late 
1980s and points to the increasing boldness of the media. He remarks: "As 
glasnost and perestroika began to be reflected in the content of the Soviet media, 
demand for newspapers and magazines increased. By 1988 demand had 
outstripped supply, leading to restrictions on opportunities for subscription to 
many organs."49 He pays particular attention to the filling in of the "blank spots'' 
of Soviet history since 1917. McNair comments on how '"before the glasnos1 
campaign control of history was one of the most important aspects of the Party's 
ideological work". 50 Prior to Gorbachev's reforms the role of the media was to 
produce a ''distorted and frequently dishonest account of history, from which all 
1:-1 Laqucr. Soviet realities, p. 7 . 
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facts contrary to the Party's authorised version of events were expunged."51 An 
absurd aspect of what passed for Soviet history was the constant rewriting of the 
roles of various leadership figures such as Stalin, Krushchev and Brezhnev to 
reflect the opinions of the current person in power. That this could only lead to 
public cynicism and undermine belief in building socialism was a factor which 
glasnost would have to rectify. (Only Lenin escaped public discrediting} The 
exposure of the appalling atrocities and crimes of Stalin and his ruthlessness now 
were openly discussed in newspapers, including such faithful exponents of the 
Party line such as Pravda. 
Clearly, factors which glamost was releasing, including the new 
freedom from fear, were having a cumulative effect on the masses which, as the 
years of reform progressed, were to further erode the whole notion that the 
ideology of Marxism-Leninism was the only way to construct a free and just 
society. Thus, perhaps in retrospect, the failure to reverse the whole Gorbachev 
experiment is not so surprising as a new public opinion had come to exist \-Vith a 
new generation who had not personally experienced the Stalin years and World 
War 2. No recourse to heavy handed military force could subjugate what 
Gorbachev had achieved. 
As far as the Soviet bureaucracy is concerned, Hazan observes that this 
strata of society had a vested interest in maintaining and prolonging the survival 
of the old order. He writes that the apparat focused on the economic aspects of 
reforms whereas the chief enemy of the conservative ideologues was glamost, in 
particular "the erosion of the party's supremacy in the Soviet society". 52 On the 
other hand the bureaucrats sought no widespread publicity in achieving their 
goal of self-preservation. "Anonymity suits their goals",53 he wTites, and "they 
prefer to stall by ignoring new instructions, continuing to implement the old 
regulations, and meticulously sticking to \Vritten letters in order to prevent new 
initiatives and slow down as much as possible the processes of economic 
revitalization favoured by Gorbachev."54 
"




While the activities of the apparat tended to be aimed more at perestroika, 
its entire existence and functioning as a parasitic class was threatened by glasnost. 
I will return to the discussion of the resistance to perestroika in Chapter 3 but for 
now it suffices to list the six main methods employed by the bureaucrats which 
Hazan identifies. These are "depriving workers collectives of their 
rights"55,"simulating 'acceleration' by intensifying production of unnecessary 
goods"56, "violating citizens constitutional rights"57, ''using ministerial power to 
impede the activity of collectives"58 (essentially blocking the relatively limited 
opportunities offered by new legislation such as the Law on State Enterprises to 
various associations and enterprises, for example kolkhozes, from being 
implemented), "activity against the co-operatives"59 (the outright refosal by the 
bureaucrats to allow these enterprises to set their own higher price, even if their 
costs merited it), and "paperwork."60 Gorbachev's major weapon against both 
conservatives and bureaucrats was to appeal to public opinion by making the Party 
more democratic. The Soviet public began to become accustomed to glasnost in 
the media, politics and public life. Thus, the reporting of bad news such as major 
disasters caused the gulf between the Soviet and Western media to become 
somewhat narrowed. This increasing access to public information was noticed by 
observers of both sides, including Western Sovietologists. McNair argues that "in 
particular, Soviet journalism is increasingly focused not only on the process of 
socialist construction, but also on the events which punctuate it".61 The Chernobyl 
tragedy was initially hushed up but its acknowledgement and its public admission 
on the part of the leadership of the USSR gave a powerful impetus to this new 
freedom. 
Secondly, glasnost now allowed the Soviet authorities to concede the 
existence of a serious crime problem in the USSR Previously, crime was 
55 Ibid., p.225. 
56 Ibid., p.226. 
57 Ibid., p.227. 
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8 lbid. 
59 Ibid., p.230. 
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61 McNak Glasnost, perestroika and the Soviet media, p.64. 
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regarded as a phenomenon specific to capitalist societies. McNair writes: 
"However, crime is a problem in the USSR, a fact which, as a consequence of 
glasnost, can now be openly declared. It can also be admitted that the averting of 
eyes by journalists before 1985 was due mainly to the Party's reluctance to 
concede this reality."62 
Thirdly, the acknowledgement of dissent on the part of many dissidents in 
Soviet society, whether political or religious, was yet another feature of glasnost. 
McNair states that this concept "has also sanctioned the inclusion on the domestic 
news agenda of politically problematic topics such as religion, dissidence, street 
protests and emigration".63 
Writing in 1990 Walter Laquer argues that, at that stage glawwst was not 
yet irreversible. He writes that "gla~most will be increasingly endangered 
because all kinds of previously suppressed tensions are now coming to the fore". 64 
The argument of the conservatives, of whom many were still active in positions 
of authority, was that Soviet society was completely unprepared for political 
freedom and would not be in the near to long term future. The authoritarian nature 
of Russian and Soviet history provided an unpromising backdrop to Gorbachev's 
liberalising experiment. Historians already have and will continue to attribute 
enormous credit to the last General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party 
because he achieved the irreversibility of glasnost and drastic political reform 
'Yvithin six short years. Reforming Tsars had not brought about such fundamental 
political reform. They had always been wary of the slippery slope of granting 
freedom of expression to the masses of their empire. Gorbachev did so, although 
he did not foresee the consequences of making the USSR a more humane and 
la\v-based state. This is, indeed, ironic. 
c,: Ibid .. p.68. 
03 lbid., p.69. 
64 Laquer. So>iet realities, p.13. 
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CHAPTER3 
The domestic socio-economic and political consequences of perestroika 
3 _ l _ Economic reforms and the Communist legacy 
Perestroika (or restructuring) was the second, and to many ordinary Soviet 
citizens, the most important aspect of the radical reforms instituted by Gorbachev_ 
The main focus was to transform the economy of the Soviet Union which had 
been functioning extremely poorly during the latter years of the era of Brezhnev 
( 1964-1982). The inheritance of an immensely ossified system which Stalin had 
put in place during the 1930s meant that consumers in the USSR were very badly 
served compared with the nations of the West and Japan. This phenomenon 
covered a \Nide range of economic activities, from agriculture to housing and, 
most disturbing, in the arena of hi-tech industries. The most significant aspect of 
the latter was the revolution in computerisation which was rapidly transforming 
the working and domestic lives of people in the non-communist world, as well as 
introducing new industries wherein the Soviet Union simply could not afford to 
lag behind 
Perhaps the most debilitating area and one which had always proved to be 
the achilles heel of the Soviet economv was agriculture. The failure of the Cnion 
,.,· ...... 
to teed its people was a telling indictment of Soviet propaganda. Its origins lie ic 
the forced collectivisation of all farms of this gigantic state, into giant collectives 
during the 1930s. The worst aspect of this incomprehensibly brutal action of the 
dictator Stalin was that it liquidated the kulak class of peasants who had been the 
most enterprising and innovative element of rural Russia, and who had benefited 
most from Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP). There was simply no incentive 
for peasants to increase production and collectivised agriculture was immensely 
unproductive_ This feature of Soviet life continued to be an inhibiting factor 
-t6 
greatly militating against the normal accumulation of wealth by more productive 
elements of the peasantry. 
Gorbachev was very aware that the Stalinist command economy he 
had inherited was simply not delivering the promised goods to the masses. 
Marshall I. Goldman asserts that Gorbachev re-emphasised what Yuri Andropov 
had begun to implement: the strengthening of the economy of the USSR and, 
especially, of labour discipline. He writes: "Although not as relentless as 
Andropov in his crackdown on labor absenteeism, he made a special effort to 
expose corruption and self-dealing. Gorbachev went even further, however, in his 
crackdown on alcoholism. "1 There can be no doubt that the effects of widespread 
aleoholism on the Soviet economy and society at large, was immense.The sheer 
costs to the state in every aspect, from frequent absenteeism from work, to the 
horrendous impact of alcoholism on family life and the related burden on health 
services and social welfare were extremely debilitating. Alcohol abuse had been 
"an integral part of the Russian way of life for centuries"2and Gorbachev must 
have been aware that a firm crackdown would bring him widespread unpopularity 
among the rank-and-file Soviet citizens for whom alcohol was their only escape 
from the bleak reality of their daily lives under communism. ln addition, curbing 
the availabilty and consumption of alcohol on such a large scale, meant a huge 
shortfall in tax revenue. This lack of public finances constituted a crucial aspect in 
the initial failure of perestroika and led to the production of 'moonshine' liquor 
suddenly becoming one of the few Soviet growth industries. Brown quotes Soviet 
economic reformer Nikolay Shmelev in early 1988: '"by giving away its revenue 
to the bootlegger, the government in the last t\vo years has sharply increased its 
budgetary imbalance and incurred a deficit which is today being covered in a 
most dangerous and unhealthy way, by the printing press."3 
A dangerous consequence of such a strategy was to generate rampant 
inflation, which Soviet propaganda had always viewed as a uniquely capitalist 
1 Marshall I. Goldman. What went wrong with perestroika, (New York, W.W.Norton and Co.,1991), p.81. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p.142, quoted from Shmelev, 'Novye trevogi', p.162. 
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phenomenon. The economic reality was that too many roubles were chasing too 
few goods and, if perestroika was to have any prospect of succeeding in 
revitalising the Soviet economy, this course was creating the twin dangers of a 
massive budget deficit and rapidly increasing prices. 
Mention has already been made of the disastrous state of the agricultural 
sector, mainly the result of Stalin's collectivisation in the late 1920s and early 
1930s. Right throughout the entire duration of its existence, agriculture remained 
the soft underbelly of the economy of the Soviet Union. Like alcoholism, all 
attempts failed to improve the situation - admittedly state ownership of all rural 
land had always been a non-negotiable principle. There had, however, been 
various experiments in other communist countries, all with a varying degree of 
success. Gorbachev was well aware that drastic reform measures were necessary 
if food production was to increase. Brovm observes that "Gorbachev was an 
admirer of the Hungarian agricultural reform, which combined some of the 
advantages of large-scale agricultural production '!hi.th the granting of a great deal 
of autonomy to co-operatives to buy equipment and sell their produce relatively 
freely, while granting individual members of the co-operative the possibility to 
diversify into other production in seasons when they had time on their 
hands". 4The positive results of such innovatio~ coupled with the dramatic 
success of agricultural reforms in China. where a wide-scale abandonment of 
communal farming in favour of individual farming had taken place, was not lost 
on Gorbachev. Enormous barriers to the introduction of such changes existed. 
hm.vever. in mral Russia. Thus, even before Gorbachev became the head of state 
he informed his Hungarian counterpart: "Unfortunately, in the course of the last 
fifty years the Russian peasant has had all the independence knocked out of 
him."5 The Russian peasantry had borne the brunt ofbuilding Stalin's command 
economy. Besides being both demoralised and alienated, it was constituted by a 
seriously disproportionate number of women as well as the elderly. These were 
inhibiting factors for reformers to bear in mind. 
·
1 Ibid. , p.142. 
5 Ibid.. p.143. 
48 
In addition, collectivisation was also an article of faith for many loyal 
communists. This meant that that there were significant ideological constraints on 
the reformers. Russian peasants were, after seventy years of the planned economy, 
very unfamiliar with the demands of the market. Capitalism was, by now, a totally 
alien form of economic organisation. \Vhilst tiny plots were allocated to rural 
labourers to tend in their spare time, the market still did not exist in any 
meaningful form. Gorbachev had to tread warily. There was always the danger of 
destroying the present collectivised system without putting anything new in its 
place. 
Brown argues that three particular differences existed between the Soviet 
experience and that of China and Hungary, which militated against bolder action. 
Firstly, the fact that Soviet socialism was a generation older than that of either of 
these two countries. He writes that "in China and Hungary there were people in 
the countryside who still remembered what it was like to farm independently". 6 
Such people who remained were very old and few in number. Secondly, "in 
Russia there had been a flight from the land of the youngest and ablest potential 
workers and Soviet farming was much more heavily dependent on capital 
equipment than was China, where a labour intensive agriculture could rapidly 
produce results once the shackles were removed from the peasantry".7 The third 
factor which Brown isolates is the sheer vastness of both Russia and the Soviet 
Union "where the transport and marketing of agricultural produce was an 
altogether formidable task". 8 
Thus, the continuing drain on the Soviet Union's balance of payments 
brought about by the regular need to import copious quantities of grain from the 
USA in particular, meant that turning the apparat - run economic machine into an 
efficient system was an intractable task. The dysfunctional Soviet economy was 
failing to fulfil even the modest desires of the country's citizens, such as adequate 
housing and a more plentiful and varied food supply, which had for so long been 




promised. This was so despite the honest and enthusiastic intentions and efforts 
of reformers such as Yakovlev and Abel Aganbegyan. The former was one of the 
major architects behind the reform effort, whilst the latter was a prominent Soviet 
economist who was devising a strategy to introduce market mechanisms to the 
Soviet economy. 
The further development of events was to completely refocus the goals 
which Gorbachev and his dedicated team were striving to achieve. Observing 
their activities and approach more than a decade later, one must identify elements 
of both enthusiasm for the cause of reforming the entire Soviet Union, and the 
knowledge that powerful factions and individuals within the Party would resist 
changes which threatened their hold on power. Thus, whereas in 1985 perestroika 
meant the renewal of socialism and the repair of the creaking economic 
mechanism (which was also straining under President Reagan's escalation of the 
am1s race),perestroika became increasingly radical during 1986 and 1987. The 
alarm bells among conservatives were ringing loudly, led by Ygor Ligachev, as 
their greatest fear of a restoration of capitalism was beginning to materialise 
before their very eyes. Their efforts at digging their heels in and obstructing 
restructuring were to fail, mainly because of the terminal nature of the ossified 
command economy. The creation of a market economy in place of a planned one 
had few parallels from which any economist could draw. This was particularly so 
where the levels of industrialisation were so far advanced, as was the case with 
the USSR. The most celebrated attempt was that of the two reform-minded 
economists, Stanislav Shatalin and Grigory Yavlinsky, who devised what became 
known as the Shatalin 500 day program (named after the former who was the 
senior of the two), in 1990. The plan involved a rapid transition to a market 
economy within 500 days. Gorbachev was initially very supportive of the efforts 
of the Shatalin team but hostility from conservative forces forced him to distance 
himself from the program. Nevertheless, the dramatic changes from Gorbachev's 
early days on assuming office in 1985 until the early 1990s remain quite 
staggering in their rapid evolution. 
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Martin McCauley asserts that Gorbachev in 1985 still believed that the 
Leninist course was the right one. He quotes him: ''We must not change our 
policy. It is right, correct, authentically Leninist. We have to accelerate our 
rhythm, go ahead, be frank and overcome our faults and see clearly our luminous 
future. "9 It is important to stress that Gorbachev always claimed to be a true 
follower of Marx and Lenin. It is not surprising that hardliners such as Ygor 
Ligachev were extremely suspicious of glasnost, perestroika, uskorenie 
(acceleration) and the call for greater democracy within the USSR. It would be 
incorrect, however to be too cynical about Gorbachev's goals. He continually had 
to balance the urgent need for reform with the hostility of his opponents. By 1987 
it had become clear to Gorbachev "that he was confronted with a systemic crisis: 
the system itself was in terminal decline". 10 An illustration of this predicament 
was that according to top economist Abel Aganbegyan in 1988, there had been no 
growth in the Soviet economy in the years 1981-1985 11 and even this scenario can 
be viewed as somewhat optimistic as other economists were of the view that there 
had actually been negative grow1h during this period. McCauley alludes to the 
fact that the extent of this crisis was not ackno"vledged in 198 5 and, therefore, the 
initial steps to deal with this critical problem failed. 12 The author quotes 
Gorbachev: "Of major importance are such fundamental problems as ways of 
accelerating scientific and technical progress and intensifying production."13 He 
also refers to the need for an "improvement of the system of distributive 
relations". 14All this failed to supply the only viable long-term remedy wlijch was 
to liquidate and replace the Stalinist inheritance, a reality which would take the 
General Secretary six years to accept. 
Even in the early years of perestroika Gorbachev was aware of the stifling 
and suffocating grip which central planning held over the economy_ .\foCaulev 
,, McCauley. Gorbachev. p.55 
1
1) Ibid 
11 Ibid. p.56. 
12 Ibid 







analyses Gorbachev and his reform team's thinking that state-owned enterprises 
could act as market agents. 15 He identifies two particular flaws in Gorbachev' s 
thinking, "ownership and prices". 16The entire ideology of Marxism-Leninism 
viewed the individual ownership of private property as anathema. Prices were not 
allowed to reach realistic levels dictated by the conventional norms of supply and 
demand and a major feature of the Soviet pricing system was the existence of 
huge state subsidies. The sh01t-term advantage of this was to keep the masses 
quiet, but this was undermined by a fatal flaw: the immense drain on the public 
finances which terminated all prospects for innovation 
By 1987 it was clear that perestroika was failing to deliver what 
Gorbachev had promised. The economy was deteriorating and the General 
Secretary's critics, on both the political right and left, were complaining about 
where he was leading the Soviet Union. McCauley alludes to the situation: "It was 
thought that perestroika would result in rising living standards and there would 
be no unemployment as the economy was restructured. There would be no losers, 
everyone would be a winner. The people had decided finally and irrevocably in 
favour of socialism. They would not tolerate the dilution of the socialist 
ownership of the means of production and the social gains of socialism. " 17 After 
1987 events unfolded rapidly, both internationally and domestically. They were to 
culminate in the anti-climactic collapse of this vast empire which had for seventy 
years been regarded as the world's first socialist state. 
Concerning this latter period, Goldman alludes to the more adventurous 
nature of Gorbachev' s approach to restructuring. He writes: '1.J nlike the first 
batch of economic reforms in 1985, the second set seemed to reflect a turning 
away from the Stalinist economic system. Gorbachev adopted a more tolerant, 
even a more supportive attitude toward market mechanisms. While he had not 
given up his determination to remain a socialist he saw the need for far-reaching 
remedies."18 He draws attention to the countervailing struggle of what were 
17 Ibid, p.63. 




termed conservative or right-wing forces. It must be noted that during the entire 
period when Gorbachev led the USS~ the term conservative or right-wing was 
used to denote the communist hardliners who wished to hold on to the Stalinist or 
even Leninist economic and political system. Similarly, liberal reformers were 
categorised as left-wing. Thus, the terminology used to indicate the political 
spectrum in the Soviet Union was inverted - an indication as to just how rigid or 
moribund political life had become in this vast goo-political entity. 
Goldman argues that Gorbachev's "continued shifting between anti-
reform and reform measures might be explained as the inevitable consequence of 
the fact that he had no road map. He knew where he wanted to end up, with a 
more productive, consumer-oriented economy (Japan would do), but he did not 
know how to get there."19 The fact that there was no relevant precedent for a 
country with a command economy converting to a capitalist market-orientated 
system meant that his actions tended to be more of an ad hoc nature. "He tried one 
approach for a while and, if that did not produce results quickly, he then tried 
something else or reversed himself. only to end up in another dead end,"20 the 
author asserts. 
3.2. The transformation of the Communist Partv 
During this period there \Vere dramatic new influences on Soviet politics. John 
f\1iiler regards perestroika as not merely reflecting changes to the economic base 
but it also "meant true perestroika (reconstruction) of institutions."21 Unlike, fo::-
example, the Chinese economic reformers, Gorbachev had always vie\ved 
political and economic reform as going together. A vigorous and dynamic debate 
within society, so he reasoned, could only provide a positive economic spin-off 
The alienated masses would be more content and, also, more productive. 
In July of 1988 various reform measures were legislated at the XIX 
conference of the Communist Party. Miller identifies three essential purposes: 




firstly, representative and responsible government involving free elections for a 
parliament which had the power to accept or reject legislative measures and 
appoint or dismiss the executive. The second point was "limitations on 
government: officials (state and Party) might serve no more than two five-year 
terms. ,m The third purpose was the introduction of the rule of law, "implying 
inter alia a new and serious role for the constitution, constitutional review, legal 
clarification of the Party's position in politics, and the Party's subjection to 
law". 23 Miller observes that "the Party had accepted that perestroika entailed 
changes to itself ".24 This latter reality was clearly a very bitter pill for many in 
the CPSU to swallow. The party of Lenin had for seventy years held an 
unchallenged grasp on the levers of political power. Many had come to fear that 
the '\vriting was on the wall" once the revolutions against communist rule had 
swept over Eastern Europe in 1989. In 1988, it is likely that only the most 
optimistic reformer would have contemplated 'disestablishment' of the Soviet 
Communist Party - i.e. the constitutionally entrenched leading role of the Party set 
out in Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution. The rapid progress of events was to 
lead to this happening in March 1990. Whether Gorbachev foresaw this outcome 
is not certain even today but it was a natural consequence of the transfer of 
political authority from the Party to the state. The election of the Congress of 
People's Deputies in 1989 and Gorbachev's assumption of the Presidency of the 
Soviet Union in March 1990 also underlined his embracement of the law-based 
state 
~_.3.The first signs of failur~ 
r-..1eanwhile, the economic sih1ation kept on deteriorating, \Vith the lives of 
ordinary working people becoming ever more difficult and unhappy. Perestroika 
was not delivering \.vhat had been promised. The reality was that the old system 
of central planning had been sufficiently undermined and even showed signs of 
collapse, but the struchires of the market had yet to be put in place. Efforts of 
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right-wing elements within Party in sabotaging perestroika led to the General 
Secretary stepping up his call for democratisation, with the aim of winning mass 
support. Goldman observes that "until the man in the street could feel he had 
some check on the behaviour of the party, government or, enterprise, he would 
never believe that he had a stake in perestroika".25 The reformers knew that there 
was a very close and direct link between glasnost and perestroika. Tatiana 
Zaslavskaia , a prominent Soviet sociologist and a leading reformer argued as 
follows: "Worker apathy can only overcome if politicians give an honest 
explanation of why the Soviet economy is in such a poor state."26 She continues: 
"The habit of half-truths ... .in a certain sense is worse than lies. If you conceal 
from people ... .information about the conditions of their own life, you cannot 
expect them to become more effective in either the economic or political sphere. 
People's trust and support can be obtained only in response to the trust placed in 
them."27 
Coleman compares the task of Gorbachev and his team of reformers as 
being akin to fixing an airplane in flight. 28 His first celebrated slogan was 
uskoreniye or acceleration in the sense that both quantitative and qualitative 
changes were planned, with the goal of doubling gross national income in fifteen 
years by the year 2000. Abel Aganbegyan who was Gorbachev's chief economic 
adviser set down the strategy: "We are going over from an authoritarian to a 
democratic economy, an economy governed by the people, with substantial 
involvement of the masses in economic management."29 The major obstacle, and 
one which was never resolved, was how to implement such ambitious aims given 
the very nature of the economic reality the reformers had to work with. There was 
very little co-operation from the economic ministries or bureaucracy whose 
numbers Coleman estimates at 20 million.30 This veritable army of paper shuftlers 
had supreme control over deciding what was to be produced, when, where and in 




'.)E Coleman, The decline and full of the Soviet empire, p.228. 
29 Ibid. 
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what quantities down to the last nut and bolt. All these functions would, in a 
market economy be regulated by the law of supply and demand and, were the 
Soviet Union to shift from the command economy to a form of market, their 
presence would be superfluous. However, such a transition was far more difficult 
to implement than merely devise in an abstract way. The plan to convert the 
Union, remarks Coleman, was flawed because the bureaucrats and their allies in 
the Politburo (the conservatives) possessed a veto over the implementation of any 
such scheme. 31 
Moreover, the economic measures that were adopted in 1986 and 1987 
had negative consequences for Gorbachev' s last four years as a leader. Goldman, 
while crediting Gorbachev with trying to move forward urgently with 
perestroika, argues that "because of indecision, inconsistency, and a poor 
understanding of the underlying economic forces involved, his amended 
economic reforms also failed to produce the desired results. In fact, because of the 
reluctant and half-hearted nature of many of these economic efforts, more harm 
than good was done."32 The legacy of hostility to private trading, whether in co-
operatives, joint ventures, or individual farming, meant that very little 
improvement in the private sector could be discerned. The law of supply and 
demand applying in the arena of enterprises that \Vere not connected with the 
government, reflected a hike in prices to accommodate economic reality. The 
Soviet public \Vas accustomed to queueing until shelves \Vere empty but, in the 
state sector, prices were not allowed to rise in response. Goldman asserts that 
rising prices in the infant private sector resulted in. for example, the popular 
perception that "co-operatives came to be viewed as either institutions owned by 
the Soviet version of the mafia or opportunities for illegal actions by state 
institutions" 31 
Brown sums up \Vhat Gorbachev was striving to achieve in l 986 and 
1987: 'The maxim that every1hing was permitted that the law did not specifically 
-'"Ibid, p.229. 
ii Ibid. 
32 Goldman, What went ·wrong with perestroika, p. l lO. 
33 Ibid., p.1.13. 
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forbid was explicitly written into three major pieces of economic legislation - the 
Law on Individual Labour Activity(l986), the Law on the State Enterprise(1987), 
and the Law on Co-operatives(1988)."34 
The discrepancy between such attempts at economic reform during 1986-
87 and their unexpected results in the following four years emerged because of 
the failure to recognise that the retention of centralised control was a severe 
hindrance to accelerating economic activity. Brown alludes to the "Law on the 
State Enterprise". It was hamstrung, the same author argues, by "the illusion that 
de-centralization of decision-making to the industrial enterprise could produce 
better results without being accompanied by a much more substantial 
marketization - including, in particular, demonopolization and price 
liberalization".35 The consequence of the "Enterprise Law" was that it "fuelled 
inflation, promoted inter-enterprise debt and failure to pay taxes to central budget, 
and did much more harm than good". 36 Strayer remarks this new law was the 
most widely devised aspect of perestroika, and the goal was ''to free the 
actual productive units - the enterprises - of the Soviet economy from the heavy 
hand of central government ministries" 37 The desire was that enterprises, over 
time, would greatly reduce the ratio of state orders to private ones. Strayer 
observes that "it did not, however, work as planned".38 The bureaucrats managed 
to retain their control of state supplies and their monopoly of state orders and the 
result was that the economic situation merely deteriorated. Many enterprise 
managers were far too inexperienced in operating independently of state orders 
that they had little enthusiasm for seeking anything from the private sector. 
Reform did weaken the central ministries' influence over the economy, as is 
evidenced from the decline in the number of staff members working in them. The 
figure cited by Strayer reveals that this fell from 1.6 million in 1986 to 871,000 in 
l 989.39 
34 Brown, The Gorbachev factor. p.146. 
35 Ibid., p.] 47. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Strayer, Why did the Soviet Union collapse?, p.115. 
38 Ibid., p.116. 
39 Ibid. 
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Zdenek Mlynar, writing in the period before Soviet power collapsed, 
remarks that "the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference in June 1988 greatly 
strengthened the position of the forces linked with the reform ideology". 40 
However, despite strong resistance and dissent on the part of conservatives such 
as Ligachev, there was no coherent alternative to what Gorbachev was 
implementing. Mlynar asserts that "Gorbachev repeatedly stated at the 
Conference that the irreversibility of perestroika is not yet guaranteed".41 On the 
other hand, any attempt to turn the Soviet economy into reverse gear and undo the 
reforms was impossible.By the late 1980s, perestroika was not even delivering a 
modest rise in living standards. On the contrary, things were deteriorating. 
Goldman argues that "the undermining of the planning system and the collapse of 
the economy, combined with continuing restrictions on non-government groups, 
had a negative effect on efforts to expand Soviet foreign trade and attract \Vestem 
investment".42 The remnants of the old system, where the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade regulated all relations between a Soviet enterprise and foreign buyers and 
sellers, continued to act as a disincentive to any realistic attempt to expand trade 
with the industrial nations of the capitalist world. Goldman argues: "Access to 
valuta and imported machinery was more a matter of political influence than 
economics.'"'n He continues, declaring that "the typical Soviet enterprise was not 
allowed to hold valuta and therefore any1hing that it had was provided to it by the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Trade. In tum, the enterprise had 
to forfeit any1hing that it earned by exporting and depositing the proceeds with the 
same two ministries.',..i4 He concludes: "T\o wonder Soviet enterprises never 
seemed to be interested in expanding their exports or moderating the magnitude of 
their imports. ,,..is 
The lack of sophistication of Soviet managers, \Vho had neither the skills 
nor the experience to cope \.Vith foreign trade only compounded the difficulties of 
-~J \llynar, Can Gorbachev change the Soviet Union. p.34. 
H Ibid. 
42 Goldman, \\-'hat went ·wrong with perestroika, p.156. 
13 Ibid., p.157. 
~ 1 Ibid. 
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an empire in flux. The inevitable result of rapidly increasing indebtedness as far 
as the balance of payments was concerned, coupled with a mounting budget 
deficit, resulted in a dismally performing economy with few prospects of matters 
improving. Even foreign firms such as McDonald's which were prepared to 
accept the huge difficulties of unpaid debts and stifling red tape, were portrayed 
by conservatives - and also many members of the Russian general public - as 
exploiters out to rob the country of its riches. The lack of familiarity of Soviet 
consumers resulted in absurdities (to Western eyes) such as people joining only 
the longest queue, in Moscow's McDonald's, despite their being 27 cash registers. 
The expectation "that the longest line forms in front of the counter with the most 
desirable goods" 46only demonstrated just how ingrained attitudes and beliefs had 
become after seventy years. By 1989, Goldman concludes that for Gorbachev 
"most likely, even an all-out reform would not have increased supplies 
significantly. After seventy years of bureaucratism, the Soviet people have 
learned to weather the various storms of reform that blow in from different 
directions. Sooner or later they pass, without making too much of a mark. 
Unfortunately, each failure leads only to increased cynicism, which in turn 
compromises other efforts in the future."47 Strayer summarises the dilemma 
facing the reformers: ''But there was no functioning market system to replace the 
discredited and partially dismantled planning system. Neither the institutions of 
the market - credit, a banking system, contract law, wholesalers, free prices - nor 
the values of the market - competition, risk taking, personal responsibility - had 
substantially developed in the few years of the Gorbachev era. Thus, perestroika 
created a kind oflimbo economy, in which neither the Plan nor the market 
worked effectively."48 
During 1990-91 Gorbachev decided to take the proverbial "bull by the 
horns." Because of the bleak economic reality, perestroika was increasingly 
blamed for the intolerable difficulties of everyday life. With the demise of the 
command economy, there could be no doubt that clinging to the increasingly 
46 Thid., p.167. 
·
17 Thid., p. 170-17 l. 
48 Strayer, Why did the Soviet Union collapse?, p.116. 
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outworn and irrelevant ideology of Marxism-Leninism was only serving as a 
brake on progress. However, the need for a drastic overhaul of so-called 
'"developed socialism" with its emphasis on central planning, led even the General 
Secretary of the CPSU to accept the dire need for a transition to a market 
economy. This had always been the biggest nightmare of the conservatives and 
Gorbachev's skills as a master political tactician were to be sorely tested. Thus, in 
1990 he intensified the move towards the market - at least theoretically. However, 
the autumn and winter of 1990-91 also witnessed a marked strategic retreat from 
reform as the pressure from conservative opponents mounted. This phenomenon 
was only temporary, however. The reasons behind this development can only be 
that the pressures from those who continued to possess a significant grip on the 
levers of power - Kryuchkov (the head of the KGB), the army and the Party itself 
- had become more intense as desperation mounted. The rapid overt resistance 
to reform was driven by the fact that many in the Party and the bureaucracy 
were witnessing the floundering of the Soviet economy, considerably accelerated 
by perestroika failing to deliver any of the much anticipated improvement. The 
rapid collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the overnight disappearance 
of the Warsaw Pact had totally undermined the one achievement of which many 
conservative were so proud, i.e. the attainment of strategic parity with the USA 
and the achievement of post-war superpower military status. Many in the Party 
blamed Gorbachev and the whole reform experiment, and it is perhaps surprising 
that stronger opposition had not arisen earlier. 1990-91 came to determine the fate 
of this vast multi-national Union, which for seventy years had acted as if it \Vere a 
single state. 
The decision to embrace the market and ditch socialism was taken because 
it \Vas the only rational way forward for a moribund economy which had 
exhausted all its options. The reaction of workers and the "man in the street" was 
interesting. Generally, they had always reflected a sense of resignation with the 
miserable lot they had been bequeathed from a revolution ostensibly conducted in 
their name. Goldman analyses these contradictions and argues that "given the 
way ordinary workers had been exploited under communis~ it might have been 
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expected that Soviet workers would have been in the forefront of the reform 
"
49 Th h . . h h movement . e aut or contmues, assertmg t at t e that "in 1989, almost 
half the country's coal miners struck and eventually organised their own 
independent unions dedicated to reform"50 would appear to have given a powerful 
impetus to Gorbachev's efforts at creating a more humane and just society. But 
the conservatives and their apparat allies were not yet a spent force. That their 
immediate western neighbour, Poland, had been the birth-place of Solidarity 
which had pioneered the independent trade union movement in the former Soviet 
bloc of nations, was not lost on the rightists. After all, communism had been 
successfully overthrown in that country and the defenders of Soviet power were 
witnessing the whole world of their privileges and "Orwellian" control of society 
and state collapsing before their very eyes. 
example of the United Russian Workers Front indicates how the 
CPSU was still able to appeal to a certain constituency and conduct a political 
campaign against everything Gorbachev was striving to achieve. The leader of 
this workers' organisation, Veniamin Y arin, was outspoken in his opposition to 
reform. He was "highly critical of Gorbachev's efforts to switch the Soviet 
economy to a market orientation and the resulting income inequalities that the 
market is likely to bring". 51 However, Gorbachev skillfully came to co-opt Yarin 
by making him a member of the cabinet-like Presidential Council and he 
eventually faded into obscurity. Ultimately, the efforts at halting the onward 
march of reform and the market, despite certain temporary successes, were to fail 
ignominiously. Perestroika had advanced to such an extent, along with glasnost, 
that the fate of the 1991 coup attempt was sealed. 
A distinguishing feature of perestroika during 1990-91 was the coalescing 
of a working team of economists which became known as the Shatalin-Yavlinsky 
group. Brown recounts how Gorbachev supported them and "took an interest in 
the work of the team as it proceeded in a dacha near Moscow throughout 
49 Goldman, ~What went. wr:ong with perestroika, p.189. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., p.190. 
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August"52 of1990. The '500 Days Program' or 'Shatalin' plan (mentioned earlier) 
banished both socialism and the whole ideology of Marxism-Leninism as a viable 
concept on which to structure the Soviet economy. Brown observes: "It 
incorporated the ideas of large-scale privatization, a great devolution of power to 
the republics, and the speedy construction of market institutions."53 Their effect 
was that "they spelled the end of state socialism and were utterly inconsistent with 
the idea that Gorbachev was still a Communist in any meaningful sense of the 
term, even though he was still General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union! ln fact, one of the more striking features ofthis episode is that he 
had entirely bypassed the party."54 The Shatalin plan was complete anathema to 
conservative communists who had always viewed the market and private 
property as institutions of exploitation which they had completely reviled. In pre-
Gorbachev days, the endless barrage of propaganda exuded from all aspects of 
Soviet information channels - from kindergarten levels to the television and radio 
services - had inured them from any positive reaction to the 'creeping capitalism' 
of perestroika. 
3.4. Factors hindering opposition to Gorbachev's reforms. 
What is most remarkable in the entire context of Gorbachev's role as Soviet 
leader is that he managed to survive so long at the helm. Pressures from 
conservatives and liberals were intense and the former could not have been 
any1hing but incensed by his unilateral renunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine. The 
mlers in the satellite nations of Eastern Europe were acutely aware that their 
remaining in office depended on the might of the Soviet armed forces. However. 
communism in the Soviet Union had pretty well outworn its "sell-by date" and, 
even in Gorbachev's early years (1985-88), opposition from a conservative such 
as Ligachev had always to pay lip-service to an agreement with the goals of 
perestroika. Gorbachev also had cleverly appealed to and made use of public 
5
: Brmvn, The Gorbachev factor. p.151. 
53 lbid., p.152. 
54 Ibid. 
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opinion, especially the Soviet intelligentsia. This latter segment within society 
had, it must be borne in mind, been a vital factor in both the February and October 
revolutions of 1917. Lenin himself had been a product of the Russian educated 
class. The Stalinist model of socialism had always been more comprehensively 
repressive than even the most reactionary Tsar, but by the mid-1980s its total 
lack of credibility among the peoples of this vast empire could not be either 
disguised or ignored. 
Gorbachev had skillfully over the years undermined the position of the 
hardliners. An example of this, which Kotkin cites, is his September 1988 
reorganisation of the Party Secretariat, where "Gorbachev created a series of 
separate, labour-intensive party commissions, each headed by a politburo 
member. Suddenly, there was no time for collective Secretariat meetings, or for 
its Union-wide supervisory functions of the still intact Union-wide party 
committees, whether for co-ordinating the elections or for a conspiracy against 
the general secretary."55 This enabled him to emasculate the power of the apparat. 
Whilst this reinforced Gorbachev vis-a vis the conservatives, it also undermined 
the Union, replacing it with a more federalised structure. 
Kotkin defines the CPS U as " a conspiracy to take power, which it did in 
1917". 56 It had, since then preoccupied itself with entrenching that power and 
retaining unchallenged authority. It had trained its own specialists in various 
fields from the military to education and, even, engineering. Unfortunately, a 
bureaucracy of its own had also been put in place. Kotkin observes: "On the 
contrary, the bureaucracy of the party continued to grow alongside the 
bureaucracy of the state, and both performed essentially the same functions: 
management of society and the economy."57 This dilemma forthe reformers is 
summarised by Strayer: "If the party was an obstacle to reform, could it also be 
the agent ofreform? And ifthe party had to be weakened or bypassed in the 
pursuit of reform, what remained to hold the Soviet Union togetherT58 
55 Kotkin, Armageddonavert~ p.77. 
56 Ibid., p.78. 
57 Ibid., p. 79. 
58 Strayer, Why did the Soviet Union collapse?, p.94. 
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Certainly, the comparison with China is not entirely justified. It was the 
most populous country on Earth and, whilst it had been traumatised by Mao and 
the Cultural Revolution, it was far more agricultural and less developed 
industrially. There was great scope for increasing agriculture by abolishing the 
communes and reverting to private farming which, in turn, could finance the 
development of industry and commerce. Thus, the Chinese leadership did not 
face the same bureaucratic and entrenched vested interests which Gorbachev 
had to overcome. Thus, they could retain absolute Communist Party control, 
which Gorbachev could not (and would not} do. Gorbachev had to devise a 
strategy to weaken the political base of the conservatives in order to undertake a 
far more complex and intractable campaign of economic reform. 
Gorbachev's main opponent, Ygor Ligachev, was unable to rally the 
hardliners within the CPSU because he lacked the courage to confront Gorbachev, 
for example, on the question of the Secretariat referred to earlier. But Ligachev 
was no man of steel. Kotkin \.\.Tites: "'But, if Ligachev had known back then that 
socialism and the Union were in danger, the bitter truth is that the person best 
positioned to do whatever was necessary to stop the general secretary lacked the 
wits and the stomach to do so."59 The countervailing pressures from liberals were 
also a deterrent not to unseat Gorbachev. Yeltsin inspired far more loathing than 
the present General Secretary and, ultimately, President. Thus, rather than 
directing blame for what transpired during those six years of perestroika, he 
denounced his aides such as Alexander \' akovlev for hijacking the ne"v policy 
\Vith the deliberate intent of abolishing socialism and the Union. Cltimately. 
resistance from the Party was too uncenain and hesitant. Even had they succeeded 
in removing Gorbachev, the enormous problems facing the Soviet t: nion would 
have remained. This inability of his adversaries to halt or reverse perestroika was 
more due to the fact that, for once in Russian and Soviet history, a sea change had 
occurred in both its social and political life. The entire Soviet union had been set 
on a journey whose immediate effects, to the contemporary populace \Vere 
unknown. but whose ultimate goal was the creation of a rational economic 
59 Kotkin, Annageddonaverted p.82. 
mechanism which would, hopefully, improve the circumstances of everyone. We 
now know that decades, not years, would have been required to achieve this goal. 
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CHAPTER4 
The rise of militant nationalism in the Soviet republics. 
4. L The collapse of the "outer empire" 
This chapter will examine the two major related problems that affiicted 
the Soviet Union during the late 1980s and early 1990s. These were the drastic 
rearrangement of the strategic status quo, during this period, where the previous 
buffer zone of satellite states in Eastern Europe, all heavily based on the Soviet 
model, were all overthrown by popular revolutions which were even encouraged 
by Gorbachev. This in tum, secondly, released a pandora's box of nationalistic 
expectations within the Soviet Union itself-: a factor which was to lead to its 
unintended disintegration and replacement v.iith fifteen successor states. 
Thus it is necessary to sketch the background of the collapse of the "outer 
Empire" in Eastern Europe which constituted the Soviet zone of influence since 
the end of the Second World \Var. Essentially, these nations had been mere client 
states and their populations were sealed off from the West through the "Iron 
Curtain_" The major focus of this chapter will be the "inner empire" of the 
constituent republics which comprised the USSR These republics were, in reality, 
the inheritance which was derived from the 1917 revolution and had all formed 
part of the Tsarist Empire which Lenin and his Bolsheviks had consolidated into 
the world's first communist state. 
It is of paramount significance to stress that the tumultuous events in 
Eastern Europe already referred to, and particularly the advent of democracy, 
had a dramatic impact on the Soviet Union. This is graphically illustrated by 
the events in the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia which had 
enjoyed independent status between the two World Wars but which had been 
forcibly incorporated into the USSR in l 940 by Stalin_ The advent of glasnost m 
particular had provided a new political framework for these suppressed peoples. 
They had observed the advent of political freedom in the Warsaw Pact nations 
and had, not surprisingly, drawn the relevant parallels with their own situations_ 
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Gorbachev had., after all, voluntarily renounced the Brezhnev doctrine and had 
refused to intervene even to save the Honecker regime in East Germany and 
prevent German reunification. The Baltic leaders and populations reasoned that 
their cause was equally just and they, too, were victims of Soviet aggression. 
Poland had tested the waters of Gorbachev's tolerance of allowing the 
Solidarity trade union (avowedly anti-communist) to assume power in that nation. 
Popular protests had brought down, not only the East German government, but 
the so-called 'velvet revolution' had also overthrown the Czechoslovak regime. 
Hungary and Bulgaria had achieved a democratic transition through negotiation 
and a bloody popular uprising, supported by the army, had overthrown the 
odious government of Ceausescu in Rumania. 
These rapid changes in the status quo in Eastern Europe and the 
subsequent disintegration of the USSR were, in the eyes of many observers, the 
most significant events to occur in the second half of the twentieth century. The 
willingness of Gorbachev to make surprising concessions to the West had 
surprised political analysts. Particularly his decision not to put any serious 
obstacle in the way of the reunification of the two German states was of 
enormous significance. This made an important impact because Germany had 
always possessed a great psychological value to the citizens of the USSR The 
defeat of Nazi Germany and the traumatic memories of the "Great Patriotic 
War" were the one major achievement of an entire generation of Russians who 
had little else to take pride in. The major role of the West German government 
of Chancellor Helmut Kohl in soothing the fears of the Soviet public while 
remaining firmly committed to the project of a united Germany maintaining its 
membership ofNato, brought about a realisation that the old Soviet inflexibility 
no longer existed. Within the USSR many peoples, particularly in the Baltics, 
were determined to seize their historical chance. Anything within the political 
sphere was now possible. This new reality was reinforced by glasnost and 
perestroika which had done so much to empower Soviet public opinion. 
Once the genie of national aspirations for independence was out of the 
bottle, events within the Soviet Union proceeded to occur at a bewildering pace. 
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The coup de grace which greatly accelerated its demise was the 1991 coup 
attempt, the amateurish failure of which hastened the immediate de iure 
independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which was then recognised 
by all nations, including the Soviet Union. The coup attempt did not really 
surprise most observers at the time. There were many major figures in the military 
and security establishment who were stunned and outraged by the overnight 
loss of the post-war empire which had solidified the status of the Soviet Union as 
a superpower, able to project its military and strategic influence world-wide. This 
development had been tolerated, albeit very reluctantly, but the open 
manifestation of both separatist tendencies and the simultaneous outbreak of 
inter-ethnic strife within the USSR's borders raised the spectre of disintegration 
of the multi-national state quite startlingly. Gorbachev was most aware of the 
looming danger and it is ironic that his very attempt to negotiate a new Union 
treaty was the pretext for the failed putsch to occur. 
4.2. Ethnic conflict in the Soviet Republics 
But what was the Soviet Union? Why was it such a contradiction, being 
militarily powerful and, yet, at the same time so fragile? The Soviet Union 
reflected a wide variety of demographic diversity, with the three Slavic nations of 
Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia being the most heavily populated and 
industrialised. For the reformers, the most intractable and explosive region \Vas 
clearly Transcaucasia. Three republics existed in this area, being Georgia. 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. The latter two entities had, since 1988. become 
embroiled in an insoluble conflict over the Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan 
ofNagomo-Karabakh. It had been made part of Azerbaijan during the Stalin era 
and had always generated a grave sense of injustice among the Armenian 
people. Glasnost played a vital role in bringing this issue to the surface, and it 
\Vas only in February1988 that the long suppressed feelings of antagonism, which 
had their seeds of germination in history, language and religion, came to boiling 
point. The worst aspect of the situation, writes Keep, was that "it was in practice 
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admip.istered from Baku, treated as a colony, and neglected in the provision of 
electric power, roads and social sevices."1 Whilst Azerbaijani nationalism was 
essentially a secular phenomenon, although there were individual Islamic 
extremists, the Azeris looked at the half a million Christian Armenians2 in the 
enclave with grave suspicion. Because of glasnost, the Armenian United National 
party was able to operate openly, gain widespread support, and agitate for this 
enclave to become once again part of Armenia. 
This led to huge demonstrations in the capital of Armenia (Yerevan) 
followed by rampant inter-ethnic violence, with massacres of Armenians in the 
industrial centre of Sumgait, near Baku which was the Azerbaijani capital. 
Retaliatory massacres of Azeris in both Armenia and Nagomo-Karabakh soon led 
to a serious refugee problem on both sides. Clearly, to the opponents of glasnost 
and perestroika, the consequences of relaxing the central government's grip on 
the smaller republics proved to be disastrous. Hardliners had always argued the 
dangers of allowing freedom of expression of nationalist sentiment. 
Gorbachev realised that he had to act swiJtly when he was faced with near 
open warfare between two Soviet republics. His approach was commendable and 
very rare in Russian history. Rather than resorting to the familiar brutal response 
of sending in an overwhelming military force backed by tanks to crush the 
outbreak of unrest, he decided, firstly, to try the path of negotiations. Once that 
approach had failed, he opted to institute direct rnle ofNagorno-Karabakh from 
Moscow. Brown comments that "although this could be only a temporary 
expedient, it was one which produced more favourable conditions for the 
inhabitants of the enclave than they had endured earlier".3 
Clearly, this conflict had long term historical roots and, as mentioned 
earlier, owed a lot to differences in religion between the two peoples. Thus, the 
Armenians remain amongst the oldest nations to embrace Christianity, whilst the 
Azeris are Turkic Muslims. The former nation were, along with the Georgians, a 
Christian island in an Islamic sea. This sense of encirclement gave rise to a deep 
1 John L.H.Keep, The last of the empires, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), p.365. 
2 Ibid 
3 Brown, The Gorbachev factor, p.263. 
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sense of grievance, anxiety and vulnerability and the Armenians had historically 
welcomed the Orthodox Russian presence, particularly during the nineteenth 
century. The latter provided an invaluable counterweight to the Islamic Ottoman 
Turks. The memory of the genocide inflicted during the First World War by the 
rulers of that empire when an estimated one million Armenians were killed was 
always a factor that the people remembered. The conflict in 1988 only 
compounded the difficulties into which perestroika had run. The institution of 
an economic blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan inflicted even more problems 
on the Soviet economy. Owing to the logic of central planning, Armenia was 
the sole source of certain vital products, for example tyres, for the entire USSR. 
l\fartin McCauley remarks on the serious political difficulties facing 
Gorbachev. The outbreak of rampant conflict in the Caucasus region not only 
confronted him and his fellow reformers with an insoluble dilemma, but his 
hardline opponents within the Politburo, KGB and military, such as Y gor 
Ligachev were demanding strong action to snuff out the conflict by the Kremlin: 
"We must bring in the troops, dismantle factories, dismiss the Party organisations 
and soviet executive committees and establish order", the latter is quoted as 
. 4 
saymg. 
ln December, 1988 Gorbachev met deputies from Armenia and Azerbaijan 
and outlined to them the stark reality facing them. He told them: "\Ve are on the 
brink of disaster. "5 The dilemma facing Gorbachev was that both sides were 
intransigent and any concession by Moscow would greatly embitter the other 
party to the dispute. Keep observes on the predicament of the central authorities: 
·'if they conceded the principle that a territory's administrative status should be 
determined solely by its ethnic make-up, scarcely any border in the Cnion would 
remain unchallenged.'.,(, Whilst the turmoil in the Caucaucas was the most 
troubling problem facing the Soviet leadership at that time, potentially dangerous 
outbreaks of nationalism based on ethnic solidarity were multiplying. Thus the 
1 McCauley, Gorbachev, p.120. 
'Ibid 
6 Keep, The last of the empires, p.366. 
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open resurgence of nationalist sentiments in republics such as Georgia, Ukraine 
and Moldova all had the potential to tear the Soviet Union apart. Georgia itself 
contained non-Georgian nationalities such as Abkhazians and South Ossettians 
and the prospect of further outbreaks of conflict were immensely alarming to the 
leadership of the USSR. Abkhazia was problematic because the population of 
their autonomous region only consisted of 18 per cent Abkhazians, whilst 
Georgians numbered 46 per cent and Russians and Armenians 15 per cent each.7 
The Georgian nationalists who demanded independence called for the inclusion 
of Abkhazia within their state. Ukraine was the second largest republic within the 
So~iet Union with a population of 42 347 387 people (1979 census)8 and also 
possessed a large and economically significant Russian minority. Moldovans, on 
the other hand, were ethnically related to Rumanians and the desire of linking up 
with their western neighbour was also a factor for the reformers to guard against. 
The potential for Islamic militancy and self-assertiveness in Central Asia was 
immense and potentially more threatening to the Slavic core of the empire. The 
need to balance all these competing dangers was extremely difficult, bearing in 
mind Gorbachev's firm resolution not to use force to maintain the Union. His 
conservative opponents, particularly the security establishment, had no such 
reservations about resorting to heavy-handed brutality to deal with dissent. 
Thus, compounding the situation facing Gorbachev was the brutal 
massacre of nineteen demonstrators in Tbilisi, capital of Georgia, in April 1989. 
This loss of life was exactly what Gorbachev had been striving to avoid, 
particularly as it would both create martyrs for the nationalist cause and lead to 
increasing bitterness among the general population. Western nations would also 
become more skeptical of Gorbachev' s credentials as a reformer, further 
jeopardising the prospect of economic aid to assist perestroika. To make 
matters worse, the Georgian Communist Party was dominated at the top of the 
structure by a corrupt and dictatorial leadership, a reality which had been present 
even in the Brezhnev era. Whilst such illegal activities had been tolerated in the 
7 Ibid, p.368. 
8 Shirin Akiner, Islamic peoples of the Soviet Union, (London, Kegan Paul International, 1983), p.44. 
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past, the mushrooming of opposition groupings, movements and parties owing to 
the reforms of glasnost had brought about increasing demonstrations by 
disaffected citizens. On the night of 8-9 April 1989 an astonishingly brutal attack 
on peaceful protestors, conducted by Soviet troops using poison gas, left nineteen 
people dead and hundreds injured. As it happened, both Gorbachev and his 
foreign minister, Eduard Sheverdnadze (who strongly supported his reforms), 
had only arrived in Moscow at midnight prior to the tragedy, from a foreign visit. 
This was significant because there had existed a leadership vacuum which was 
filled by hardliners, particularly Y gor Ligachev and KGB chief Viktor 
Chebrikov. They were the individuals to blame and Gorbachev was exonerated 
from all responsibility for the massacre. 
Brown assesses the importance of these events. "The events in Tbilisi of 
April 1989 thus demonstrated that the harsh use of force could in the new climate 
of raised expectations and aroused civic courage, produce the opposite effect from 
that intended by the Soviet authorities."9 It certainly stimulated a desire for 
independence which had hitherto been latent and viewed as unrealistic in pre-
Gorbachev days. It threatened to open a pandora's box as there were major 
complications with smaller nationalities within the Georgian Republic. Thus, 
the desire of the Abkhazians and South Ossettians to remain within the Soviet 
Union and opt out of any breakaway of the Georgians from the USSR clearly 
illustrates the potential disaster which could unfold. Brown emphasises the 
enormity of the problem that faced Gorbachev: "The last thing Gorbachev wanted 
was to lose any part of the Soviet Union following the loss - as his domestic 
enemies on the right certainly saw it - of Eastern Europe " 10 
His survival in office despite the geo-strategic loss of a cordon sanitaire of 
buffer states acquired after the loss of so much blood on the battlefields of the 
Second World War, and their replacements by non-communist states, surprised 
many observers. But the heanland of the Soviet Union was to provide the crucial 
litmus test. "Yet he believed that if he were to stand idly by while parts of the 
9 Brown, The Gorbachev factor, p.265. 
10 Ibid., p.267. 
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Soviet Union dropped off, he would be forgiven neither by his contemporaries nor 
by future generations of Russians", 11 argues the author. In retrospect, these were 
not unreasonable fears, as problems multiplied in previously compliant regions 
such as lJkraine and Central Asia. Thus, the refusal to allow the three Baltic 
states to secede from the Soviet Union was understandable. This was despite the 
belated admission of the authorities that their occupation and incorporation by 
Stalin in 1940, in terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, had been illegal. The 
sensitivity of this issue was so great that even the United States was careful not to 
place too much pressure on him over it 
The Ukraine had a long and very close association, dating back several 
centuries, with Russia. Ukrainians also were fellow Slavs and the overwhelming 
majority were Orthodox Christians. They constituted a significant demographic 
influence and the estimated ten million ethnic Russians within this republic were 
concentrated in its eastern industrialised region. Moreover, many Ukrainians also 
lived outside the borders of the republic. The Ukrainians had always possessed a 
somewhat ambivalent attitude to their close relationship with their much larger 
neighbour. A strong and abiding desire existed on the part of many Ukrainians to 
assert their own national identity as a separate nation distinct from Russia. For 
some, acceptance of being part of the Soviet Union prevailed, but many others 
yearned for real independence. Nationalist dissidents had been routinely 
harassed by the KGB which had maintained a tight stranglehold over any 
manifestations of such tendencies. Economically, Ukraine was completely 
intertwined with the Soviet Union. It was, perhaps, the most crucial 
agricultural region in the entire empire, being endowed with the rich soils of 
the black earth belt which had always provided rich yields - a kind of granary on 
which the USSR depended. It had experienced among the worst excesses of 
Stalin's collectivisation of agriculture. The terrible ideologically induced famine 
of the early 1930s had, observers overwhelmingly agree, claimed the lives of 
several million peasants and their families, a powerful grievance against both 
Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet state which it had spawned. Being highly 
II Ibid., p.268. 
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industrialised also made it the source of many of the USSR's industries 
and its huge demographic size did give it a considerable leverage in Soviet 
politics. Climate also contributed to its crucial significance to the Communist 
rulers. Despite the vastness of the USS~ its only warm water port remained 
Odessa, situated on the southern Ukrainian coast and its access through the 
narrow Bosphorous strait was of incalculable strategic significance to a 
superpower with global ambitions. 
The establishment of popular fronts in the various republics after 1985 
was a direct consequence of glamost. Their proliferation, with examples such 
as Sajudis in Lithuania and Rukh in Ukraine had allowed vital breathing space 
for nationalists in the subject nations of the USSR.Those behind their creation 
did not, initially, envisage as their goal (in the case of Rukh in particular) the 
establishment of an independent 1.Jkrainian state. The original goal was, at least 
ostensibly, to popularise, celebrate and indeed promote Ukrainian language and 
culture which had for so long been submerged by that of its far more powerful 
Russian neighbour - even in Tsarist times - and provide a rallying point for all 
Ukrainians. However, many of their people were content and even proud of their 
contribution to the building of the Soviet Union which was, at least in the military 
field, one of only two superpowers on the planet and a leader in scientific and, 
especially, space research. 
Yet the seeds of agitation for independence had been present for many 
decades. The advent of glasnost encouraged the articulation of dissident 
nationalist sentiments, and had the particular effect of transforming the political 
situation within a mere few years. The iron fisted approach of Gorbachev's 
predecessors, which had ruthlessly crushed all forms of 'bourgeois nationalism' 
as relics of the pre-socialist era, had confined supporters of independence for 
the nation to either prison or psychiatric hospitals. Indeed, not only nationalists 
but also any dissident who questioned the validity of the Soviet system and, in 
particular, Marxist-Leninist values was liable to suffer the same fate. This was 
the case in all republics. The USSR was internationally condemned for its abuse 
of psychiatry and had even been expelled from relevant world bodies for such 
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practices. Rukh played a crucial role in providing a focus for Ukrainians to have 
hope in a more hopeful and prosperous future. The tumultuous events in Eastern 
Europe in 1989 illustrated the fact that now, perhaps, anything was possible. 
Gorbachev has to be commended for his commitment to human rights 
in the face of the outbreak of ethnic nationalisms and conflicts. The security 
establishment, conservative critics within the Party, and even certain Russian 
nationalist elements demanded a harsh crackdown. His hardline critics viewed 
him as indecisive and too nai've in his belief that the union could be held together 
without recourse to a brutal crackdown. He did, however, make an attempt to 
preserve a federation of some sort with greater powers for the republican 
periphery. Lack of enthusiasm by l 990-91 led him to dilute this to a 
confederation, and although the three Baltic republics refused to retain any links 
with the Soviet Union, he did gain the support of some important republican 
leaders. Unfortunately, his enemies on the right of the Soviet political spectrum 
saw the impending disintegration of their treasured seventy year old Leninist 
legacy occurring before their very eyes and believed that Gorbachev was going 
too far in his attempts to placate the republics. Brown makes this astute and 
telling observation: "The greatest machinery of government in the world would 
not, of course, have resolved the fundamental political conflicts within Soviet 
society. At some point the transformation of such a long established Communist 
system into a non-Communist system .... and the threat of the breakup of the 
multi-national state, itself an unintended consequence of the democratization of a 
highly authoritarian regime, were bound to lead to a showdown."12 
Gorbachev's tum to the right in the winter months of 1990-91 was induced 
by the relentless pressure from orthodox communist conservatives. He was 
compelled to retreat from his bold reform plans for Soviet society and economy 
and was forced to hold reform in abeyance, at least temporarily. It appears 
to have been a desperate attempt to placate the hardliners who were exerting 
such tremendous pressure on him. Brown comments on this and argues that 
''whatever criticism can be levelled at Gorbachev concerning the most 
12 Ibid., p.285. 
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disappointing years of his leadership - from October 1990 to March 1991 - has to 
be tempered by amazement that he was able to cany with him so long, and 
however reluctantly, the defenders of the old order. It is hardly surprising that 
matters came to a head when the very existence of Soviet statehood was at issue_ 
By 1991 even the arguments over what kind of political or economic system was 
being created became subordinate to the question of what kind of union, if any, 
could be preserved."13 
Two particular regions require further discussion. These are, firstly, the 
Russian Federation which now had its own parallel government and political 
structure under its newly elected President Boris Yeltsin and which constituted 
the very core of the USSR, and, secondly, Central Asia, very much a backward 
region with very strong nomadic and Islamic roots which set it apart from the 
rest of European Russia. The ethnic make-up of Central Asia was complicated 
by the intrusion of several million Russian Slavic settlers into the area. The 
Soviet authorities had, since the revolution, encouraged the migration of these 
people into the region with the goal of building up socialism in Central Asia. The 
propaganda of the Communists had always made much of the activities of 
settlers to the area. On the other hand, it also served to strengthen the control 
of Moscow over Central Asia and retard the growth of nationalist or religious 
sentiments there. The phenomenon was most pronounced in Kazakhstan \vhere 
Russians outnumbered the indigenous population and were concentrated 
mainly in the urban centres. 
4_3_ The changing position of Russia within the Soviet Union 
The Russian Federation had often been viewed by many observers, both 
Russian and foreign, as being coterminous with the Soviet Union. Thus, it was 
not uncommon to many Russians to view other languages with considerable 
disdain and they refused to learn them. This so-called Great Russian chauvinism 
had been encouraged since the Stalinist era and, quite naturally, provoked 
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considerable resentment among other nationalities. As the RSFSR (Russian 
Soviet Federated Socialist Republic} constituted approximately three quarters of 
this vast Union, possessed the dominant language of science and educatio~ and 
numbered over half the entire population this reality is perhaps not surprising. But 
many Russians viewed their status from a considerably different perspective. 
They possessed fewer national rights than the other fourteen republics, it was 
argued. The example of the fact that Russia, alone among the Soviet constituent 
republics, did not possess its own Academy of Sciences, was often raised. 
However, Russians in particular, did tend to dominate the top leadership roles and 
executive positions in the entire USSR and, prior to glasnost , there had been felt 
little need to establish its own parallel structures. This changed very dramatically 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s as more radical reformers sought to establish a 
political power base outside the Soviet centre and it culminated in the direct 
popular election of the Russian Federation's first President, Boris Yeltsin, in June 
1991. The roots of this development lay in the increasing loss of authority at the 
Soviet centre where there existed a perception that brute force and intimidation of 
political opponents was discounted by Gorbachev and his follow reformers. 
Another factor in Russia's determination to assert its own identity had its origin in 
the political ambitions of Yeltsin, who had been humiliated by Gorbachev - he 
had been expelled from the Politburo of the CPSU and publicly berated by the 
latter figure for openly criticising the slow pace of change in Gorbachev's first 
four years as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party - and he assumed 
the mantle of more radical reform. A powerful Russia offered a great opportunity 
for him to advance his career. Yet, the path of reform and the rise to prominence 
of a Russian nationalist movement "was bound to take a different form than it did 
in other union republics, where elites had a more readily identifiable common foe, 
usually although not invariably the 'imperial' power, against which they could 
rally popular support."14 The feeling among many Russians was that their 
nationality was unfairly blamed by other ethnic groups for the actions of past 
Soviet leaders and many believed, perhaps rightly, that they had indeed been 
14 Keep, The last of the empires, p.384. 
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unfairly treated in the allocation of resources from the Soviet centre. The position 
of the Russians who lived in other republics was also a source of concern. Keep 
asserts: "Many of these expatriates - over 25 millio~ according to some 
calculations - had gone there unwillingly. Did they deserve to be seen as 
colonialist pieds-noirs? Whether employed as cadres or as simple workers and 
farmers (in Kazakhsta~ for example), they had laboured for the common good. ff 
abuses had been committed, surely the blame for them should be placed on the 
makers of imperial policy, not its executants? There should be no question of 
collective guilt."15 Russia was not the Soviet Unio~ and despite the periods in 
history when attempts were made to glorify and even Russify the minorities, its 
status was rather a part of a much larger whole. The rise of Yeltsin and other 
movements, such as pamyat, must be seen in this light. 
Yeltsin' s dramatic rise to such a prominent position created something 
of an intractable dilemma for Gorbachev. The former came to be a major rival 
for the Soviet leader, who did not enjoy the legitimacy of a popular mandate 
directly chosen as leader from the electorate. The ascendancy of Russia as a 
political entity distinct from the Soviet Union also accelerated the advance of 
the cause ofliberal democracy. Thus, Yeltsin was, for example, prepared to 
defy Gorbachev and the authority of the CPSU and issue a decree recognising 
the independence of Lithuania. Clearly, considerable confusion existed as to 
which authority, Soviet or Russian, was supreme and who exactly should be 
obeyed. 
!'lot surprisingly, Yeltsin and his team of radical democrats were, even 
more than Gorbachev, complete anathema to the right-vving conservative forces 
within the Kremlin leadership. Brown comments on the conflict between the two 
leaders. "A huge impetus to the ultimate breakup of the Soviet Union had been 
given by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation in June, 1990, some two 
weeks after Yeltsin became its chairman, when it declared political sovereignty 
and the supremacy of Russian law over union legislation."16 On Yeltsin's aims, 
16 Brown, The Gorbachev factor, p.287. 
78 
17 Ibid. 
Brown writes: "Yeltsin' s increasing rejection of the union had been based not 
only on the more radical policies which he was prepared to pursue but, still more, 
on the fact that the all-union authorities and Gorbachev in particular, stood 
between him and full power in Russia, including the symbolically important 
occupancy of the Kremlin."17 The reality was that national politics had been 
very much personalised. Gorbachev remained the incumbent authority and he 
was very much an urbane, reasoning and sophisticated individual. His rival was 
a highly ambitious populist who possessed simultaneously a burning desire for 
revenge. There was indeed an element of opportunism in his actions. The fact 
that both men were prominent reformers became obscured by the fierce power 
struggle between them. 
Increasingly, Gorbachev came to accept that the only prospect of halting 
the process of disintegration of the USSR with new problems arising in the 
various republics was to alter the Union between them, which had seemed so 
omnipotent in pre-Gorbachev days, into a much looser confederal structure. The 
Novo - Ogarevo process was designed by Gorbachev to achieve just this 
devolution of power to the republics which would then be sovereign entities. The 
name Novo-Ogarevo was derived from the country house near Moscow where 
the leaders of nine union republics, including Russia, met to discuss exactly 
what kind of union, political and economic, could be preserved from the rump of 
what remained of the Soviet Union. It must be noted that all three Baltic states 
refused to have anv dealings with these discussions as thev were determined 
.,, '1..,; .,,. 
to reassert their independence from the USSR However, the actual meaning of 
the term "sovereign" was left to be somewhat ambiguous, and it was hoped by the 
Soviet leader that such concessions would pacify the demands of the periphery 
whilst at least preserving the essence of the USSR as a full participant in 
international affairs. lt must be stressed that the powers of the centre would be 
severely curtailed. This dilution of Soviet power inspired panic among 
conservatives and the signing of the agreement was to lead directly to the 
disastrous August, 1991 coup attempt. The failed coup and its immediate political 
79 
consequences for the Soviet Union will be further examined in the last section of 
this chapter. 
The one region of the Soviet Union which has not, as yet, been fully 
explored in this analysis is that of Central Asia. In pre-Soviet days it had all 
generally been referred to as Turkestan and it happened to be the last region to 
come under the authority and control of the Tsars. The Bolsheviks had divided it 
into several different ethnically based republics, with the largest of them being 
Kazakhstan. Two particularly striking features of Soviet Central Asia were, firstly 
its sheer vastness and backward nomadic character and, secondly, the all-
embracing prevalence of Islam which united the whole area and gave it its 
distinctive feature compared with the European Orthodox Christian empire which 
had colonised it. Soviet rule, ostensibly designed by Lenin to liberate it, had 
proved to be both disastrous - the death of 2 million Kazakh nomads during the 
Stalinist collectivisation of agriculture is certainly the worst example - whilst it 
also possessed certain progressive and beneficial aspects. The two features which 
spring to mind are massively improved literacy and the enhancement of the 
position of women in society and economy. The status of Islam did suffer from 
the avowedly atheistic communists and the practice of it was actively 
discouraged. There also was, as mentioned previously, a huge influx of Slavic 
settlers - predominantly Russian - into the region, a piece of social engineering 
actively encouraged by consecutive Soviet governments. Their presence was 
heavily concentrated in urban centres such as Alrna-Ata in Kazakhstan and 
Tashkent in Uzbekistan. 
The most prominent characteristics of the Soviet Central Asian economy 
\Vere its relative underdevelopment vis-a-vis European regions of the Union 
and its dependence on a mono-culture of cotton, much of it irrigated, which 
supplied the Soviet Union with most of its needs of this product. The rapidly 
gro\.ving indigenous population, according to various observers, constituted a 
demographic time bomb for the future of the USSR. \Vbilst the Slavic core of 
the Soviet Union had a worryingly low birth rate for economic and social 
planners, all attempts to encourage the surplus work force to migrate to European 
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areas of the Soviet Union where the demand for labour was most pressing had 
failed lamentably - it appears Central Asians saw little prospect of improving 
their lives by doing so - and the region was very definitely a headache for Soviet 
planners. Huge energy resources, most notably those of oil and natural gas, 
promised rich dividends in economic terms and it was hoped that there would be 
no need in the future to continue to subsidise this region. 
4. 4. Islamic fundamentalism and the war in Afghanistan 
Another major factor which concerned the Soviet government was the possible 
spread of the phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism to this region from 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and lran. The USSR had been involved in propping up 
militarily an unpopular Marxist-Leninist government in Afghanistan, where a 
plethora oflslamic movements were waging a jihad or holy war against 
both the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul and Soviet forces since 1979. Once 
again Gorbachev was faced with a difficult dilemma. It was necessary to 
counterbalance the expansion of Islamic militancy into the atheist heartland of the 
Soviet Union with the rising level of unpopularity of continuing a war which 
could not be won on the battlefield. The rising number of Soviet casualties made 
the conflict more urgent once glasnost made Soviet public opinion count. It was 
the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party who played a major role in 
bringing an end to the involvement of the Union in this conflict. Brown writes: 
"What is not really in doubt is the decisive role of Gorbachev in ending the Soviet 
military intervention in Afghanistan. Asked who had the final say, Y akovlev 
replied: 'Mikhail Sergeyevich (Gorbachev) - of course he had the final say. 
Enough hesitation, he said, the troops must be withdrawn - that's all there is to it. 
They must be withdrawn.'" 18 
The strongest factor militating against a rapid explosion of Islamic 
fundamentalist sentiment in Soviet Central Asia was, firstly, the near total 
dependence of this region on the European Slavic centre - especially insofar as the 
rn Ibid., p.235. 
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economy was concerned - and, secondly, the reality that Soviet rule had created 
new elites who were able to dispense patronage with the assistance of the huge 
Russian nomenk/atura. Such a class of leadership had a vested interest in 
maintaining the status quo and probably took an even firmer stance and action 
against religious dissent. Central Asia was not, politically, as dangerous a threat 
threat to Soviet rule as many Western observers and commentators had predicted 
it would be. 
4.5. The secession of the Baltic states 
Certainly, the three Baltic states and the Transcaucasus republics were far more 
of an immediate danger to the maintenance of the Soviet Union as a distinct 
political and legal entity under international law. Gorbachev had been placed in 
an extremely difficult position in, particularly, Lithuania. Ultimately, all attempts 
at balancing reformists with hardliners within the Party, military and security 
establishment was impossible. This was the case within any medium to long-term 
strategy. Besides internal disagreement, there remained the pressures of the 
Western governments and media who would soon cease their support for 
Gorbachev if any brutal crackdown occurred in these three republics. The 
attempts to persuade the Lithuanian public to reject secession and independence, 
which had been declared in March 1990, did not meet with any success. His 
counter-strategy was to employ the stick of an economic blockade by the L"nion 
for three months and the promulgation of a Law on Secession in April 1990. The 
new legislation stipulated that a minimum of two-thirds of a republic's 
electorate had to approve independence, a five-year transition period had to be 
>vaited for and, finally, the Soviet legislarure also had to approve it. The scarcely 
disguised aim of the law was to make secession impossible. Unforrunately, 
certain elements within the military took matters into their own hands as the 
leader of the USSR increasingly became a captive of conservatives during the 
winter of 1990-91. The assault by Soviet troops on the Vilnius television centre 
on 13 January 1991 killed fourteen Lithuanian civilians and caused widespread 
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anger and bitterness in the Baltic. Miller observes the following: "It was an 
attempt to use force against an elected government, and to establish the precedent 
that some political organisations but not others had access to armed force. It was 
thus an attempt to reverse the CPSU disestablishment of March 1990. And the 
attempt was known in advance to some in Moscow. "19 Whilst Gorbachev was 
blamed for this brutal attack, Miller doubts whether this is justified. He writes: 
"There is unlikely to have been a direct or coordinated plot to reimpose 
pro-Soviet governments in the Baltic; rather a climate of fear and confosion was 
encouraged, in which it may have been hoped, supporters of non-communist 
governments would have been cowed (or provoked), opposition to them 
strengthened, and freebooters could seize their chance. Gorbachev would seem 
to have been consenting to this process - and among the freebooters were figures 
who reappeared in the August coup."20 
In Latvia's capital, Riga, there was further bloodshed when Ministry 
of the Interior troops killed four people and matters appeared to be reaching a 
highly uncertain and potentially dangerous climax. Both Latvia and Estonia 
contained a significantly larger proportion of ethnic Russians in their populations 
and an emotional response of savage repression of the indigenous Baltic 
inhabitants could have tilted the balance of power in favour ofGorbachev's 
anti-reformist opponents. Public opinion in Russia could also have been changed 
in support of the latter as people might feel that their fellow Russians were in 
danger of being reduced to alien nationals and second class citizens in states 
which had, for fifty years, been part of the Soviet Union. 
The winter of 1990-91 marked a distinct period when Gorbachev 
became increasingly obviously a captive of conservative elements within both 
the Party and security establishment. This has been observed in developments 
in the aforementioned Baltic republics. From March 1991 this evident tilt to the 
right was replaced by a return to trusting the advice of his most reliable 
reformist advisers. Brown remarks that " the upshot was that Gorbachev 
19 Miller, Mikhail Gorbachev and the end of Sgvict power, p.173. 
20 Ibid., p.174. 
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decided to take the initiative once again and embark on what he called the 
'Novo-Ogarevo process. "'21 This was, in essence, an agreement signed at 
the President of the USSR's country house on 23 April 1991 with the leaders of 
nine Union-Republics, including Yeltsin. Miller asserts that "implicit in this 
was recognition by the Union administration of the sovereignty of the Union-
Republics; and that the federation inaugurated by the Union Treaty should be a 
very weak one in which the Centre would retain only a minimum of power.".22 
For such a process or agreement to have any chance of success he required 
the support of the major participants in the drama, the Russian Federation 
(dominated by his arch-antagonist Yeltsin) and at least the participation of 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The Novo-Ogarevo agreement offered the only hope 
for the continuation of some form of Union (rather more a confederation) but it, 
paradoxically, triggered the 19-2 l August 1991 coup attempt. Bro\\11 asserts that 
"four drafts were published - in November 1990 and in March, June, and August 
1991 "23 He stipulates that "each version devolved more power to the republics 
than its predecessor, and it was the last version - published on 14 August - and the 
imminent signing of it on 20 August which determined the timing of the failed 
putsch". 24 The most important players in the drama of the process at Novo-
Ogarevo were Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Both were under intense pressure from 
their respective constituencies, a reality illustrated by the comment of a hardline 
conservative in the Soviet Politburo. Brown quotes him as saying: "What have 
you done, boys .... You have thrown away power, and with it the Union, '":5 
4 6. fhe AuL>ust coup and collapse of the Soviet Union. 
The attempted coup of 19-21 August, 199 l and its disastrous failure delivered 
the final fatal blm,v to the CSSR. All the major conspirators were senior members 
of Gorbachev's cabinet. They included his Prime l\tlinister Pavlov, Vice-President 
.:i Brov.R The Gorbachev factor, p.286. 
:: .\tiller, ~1ikhail Gorbachev and the end of Soviet power, p. l 75. 
::.' Brmvn, The Gorbachev factor. p.287. 
24 lbid. 
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Y anaev, minister of State Security and KGB chief Kryuchkov, and Defence 
minister Yazov, all personally appointed by Gorbachev. The main catalyst for 
the attempted putsch was the imminent signing of a new Union treaty on 20 
August which precipitated the action on 19 August. What does seem clear is that 
the conspirators viewed Yeltsin and his radical followers as the real enemy and 
had hoped to win over Gorbachev to support their plan. Keep sketches the 
dilemma facing them: "They knew what they disliked - the Union treaty, the new 
Party programme, market economics- but were less sure of what they wanted. 
How far was the clock to be put back: to 1988, to 1984, or to 1953? The second 
date is the most plausible",26 he contends. Their action of staging the coup was 
hoped to be presented as legal and in accordance with the Soviet constitution but, 
unfortunately for them and of crucial significance to its subsequent failure, 
Gorbachev would not support them. He was on vacation in the Crimea and, on 
August 18 at 4:50 p.m., a delegation of the plotters approached him. They 
claimed to be representing the State Committee for the State of Emergency and 
demanded he support their actions or resign. Gorbachev refused to acquiesce to 
their demand and, writes Coleman, his response was: "You are nothing but 
adventurists and traitors, and you will pay for this. Only those who want to 
commit suicide can now suggest a totalitarian regime in the country. You are 
pushing it to civil war. "27 
The response of the plotters was to place Gorbachev and his family under 
house arrest. The lame claim that the President was ill and needed to be relieved 
of his responsibilities fooled nobody, especially the public and the new 
democratic leaders. Yeltsin led the resistance and declared the Emergency 
Committee illegal, a call for a general strike was made, and large crowds gathered 
around the Russian parliament building, the so-called White House. The dramatic 
presence of strong public resistance to the coup unnerved the plotters. Despite 
the fact that they could have broken the resistance around Yeltsin, they decided 
to attempt a way out of the situation and sought an audience with Gorbachev. 
25 Ibid., p.289. 
26 Keep, The last of the empires, p.402. 
21 Coleman, The decline and fall of the Soviet empire, p.344. 
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Keep asserts that "apparently orders were given to storm the building, but some 
units .... refused to obey."28 The result was that, given their indecisiveness and 
lack of nerve, the coup collapsed. 
Whilst the credit for the resistance and ultimate collapse of the putsch 
must go to Yeltsin, the initial refusal by Gorbachev to co-operate and his decision 
to stick to his democratic principles ensured that such a hesitant and amateurish 
attempt to reverse six years of glasnost and perestroika would fail. Had there not 
been so many people prepared to defend their new liberties, the coup may 
ultimately have succeeded and again set back both Russian and Soviet history. 
The failure of the attempt at reversing reform led to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The rebellious Baltic states declared their full independence and 
even Gorbachev recognised this new reality, as did the international community. 
The nationalities question could not be resolved within the context of an 
imploding dysfunctional economy. Moreover, the desire of other nationalities to 
be free from Soviet power and the totalitarian control it had exerted for seventy 
years, proved to be too powerful to resist once the door to freedom had been 
slightly opened. Gorbachev had striven to save the Soviet Union as, ironically, 
the coup plotters had. Both had failed and on 31 December 1991 the USSR 
ceased to exist as a sovereign entity under international law_ 
"'' Keep, The last of the empires, p. 403. 
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CONCLUSION 
In assessing Gorbachev's bold experiment in both democratising the Soviet Union 
and transforming its economy, one can conclude a decade after the collapse of the 
empire that he did succeed in attaining the former goal but only at a very high 
cost The USSR no longer exists as a sovereign entity and its major 
successor state, the Russian Federation plays a much more limited and 
circumscribed role in international affairs. This remains a source of profound 
regret and even anger among many former Soviet citizens. In addition, the 
collapse of the extensive social welfare system, which somewhat ameliorated 
the constricted lives of the Soviet citizens, has brought about widespread poverty 
for the bulk of many people. 
The introduction ot: initially, perestroika had been welcomed by many 
people because it was believed that it would bring Soviet citizens a standard of 
living more in line with the rest of the developed world. The attempt to stay the 
course led to what hostile opponents and skeptical committed socialist 
ideologues had feared - the collapse of the entire command economy and the 
reintroduction of capitalism. 
The effect of drastic economic change, of an extent certainly not 
envisaged by Gorbachev and his enthusiastic team of reformers, was and 
remains today, extremely widespread. Thus, the Baltic republics transition to 
independent status, has considerably benefited them when measured in both 
political and economic terms. These states, however, were only regaining what 
had been so cruelly snatched from them by the Molotov-Ribbentropp pact and 
they were also closer culturally to Western Europe than the other successor states. 
The Russian Federation, with its unparalleled natural resources, of which oil 
and natural gas are the most significant, has managed to cope \Vith Yeltsin's 
painful transition to the market. However, life has become exceedingly grim 
for the remainder of what was the periphery of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the 
Soviet obsession with central planning had locked all republics into a tight 
network of inter-dependence. A suitable example is Central Asia, which had 
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survived on a mono-culture of cotton, but has suffered dearly for this in the post-
Soviet era. 
Gorbachev had envisaged the USSR being a more efficient and dynamic 
economy and society, well able to exploit the enormous riches of skilled and 
highly trained manpower which was one positive legacy of the Soviet Union. 
Unfortunately for the reformers, attempts at overhauling the creaking mechanism 
of the planned economy had the reverse effect of what had been intended. Thus, 
even during the Gorbachev era, the entire Soviet edifice unraveled. Shortages 
appeared in various sectors, while the continued overproduction of certain 
commodities, such as steel, became absurd once the nonnal logic of market 
economics began to be introduced. 
More shocking to many people indoctrinated with the egalitarian ethos 
of Marxism-Leninism was the overt appearance of very sharp discrepancies 
in wealth among various strata of the population. Thus, certain opportunistic 
individuals and groups came to flaunt conspicuous wealth - the new oil czars are 
perhaps the best example of this phenomenon - whilst the majority of ordinary 
Soviet citizens found it an increasingly difficult task to sustain a meagre daily 
existence. Pensions and wages became worthless as the effects of rampant 
inflation came to be felt. Even unemployment became yet another feature of the 
perestroik<I years. After seventy years of guaranteed employment, albeit at a low 
level for most people, and being told exactly what to think, adjusting to the 
multiple responses of the new market economy was nigh impossible. It is thus not 
surprising that crime, including an openly operating Russian mafia, increasingly 
punctuated life in the Gorbachev era. For the bulk of Soviet citizens at this 
juncture in their history, especially in the short to medium term, the economic 
downside of perestroik<I in part.icular outweighed any tangible benefits of reform. 
However the biggest positive aspect of reform for many people, both 
within the Soviet Union and in the subject nations of Eastern Europe, was 
independence for the fifteen Union republics of the USSR For the former hapless 
victims of the machinations of the Yalta conference which had divided Europe 
along ideological lines, the opportunity to rejoin the political, cultural and 
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economic mainstream of the prosperous West was enthusiastically seized. The 
rapid reunification of Germany and the coming of democracy and freedom to 
countries such as Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia with limited violence -
only Romania experienced a violent uprising - was an achievement for which 
Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990. The end of the Cold 
War and the destruction of the Stalinist model of government and command 
economv were Gorbachev' s crownin2 achievements. Within the former Soviet 
- '-' 
Union, independence for long suppressed regions such as the Ukraine was greeted 
enthusiastically. 
In addition, another positive aspect of Gorbachev's reforms was the 
introduction of democracy with all its ramifications. The goal of a law-based 
state was achieved, albeit imperfectly, and the broad mass of the population 
was liberated from fear. Thus the development of a vigorous open press which 
could challenge the Leninist orthodoxy has continued into Putin's independent 
Russia today. The end of political censorship could only expose the moral and 
and intellectual bankruptcy of communism in its Soviet guise. The fact that the 
basic litmus test of democracy - government vvith the consent of the governed -
was now established was to inspire many ordinary Russians to defy and 
ultimately to defeat the machinations of the coup plotters. Gorbachev's brave 
and comprehensive reforms resulted in the USSR having a totally transformed 
character from the society which had enabled Brezhnev to oust Krushchev in 
1964. Democratic structures had been appropriated by the people and glasnost 
had exposed the crude falsehoods of Soviet propaganda. 
The final freedom which must be briefly mentioned is the right to freedom 
of religion and conscience. Thus the disappearance of restrictions on the activities 
of the church, particularly the Orthodox faith, allowed it to regain at least some of 
its place in post-communist Russia. Other religions such as Islam and Buddhism 
also benefited from the liquidation of the atheist state which the Communist Party 
had sought so actively to establish. 
A final assessment of this conclusion is that certainly perestroika and 
the introduction of the market brought serious and, in many cases severe 
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economic hardship to many citizens of the empire. This was particularly a 
feature of the years of transition. Counterbalancing this are the benefits of 
democratisation and liberalisation which proceeded far beyond Gorbachev's 
initial aims. Thus, any assessment of his successes must be qualified. An 
important question which has puzzled many historians is why the rapid demise 
of the Soviet Union occurred so relatively peacefully? Strayer asserts: "The 
August coup notwithstanding, the defenders of the established system, including 
an entrenched party elite, a fearsome KGB, and the military forces of a global 
superpower, put up an amazingly modest resistance against those who sought to 
end their power and their privileges. " 1 He finds the answer in the transition of 
the USSR into "a corrupt and sloppy bureaucracy, full of cynicism and 
self-seeking."2 Clearly, those who ran the Union had long since become 
complacent and certainly had little belief in the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. 
The effect of glasnost was to destroy their legitimacy in the eyes of the public 
and they lacked the determination to fight for power, especially with the 
economic implosion wrought by perestroika. The scenario which prevailed in 
the republics of the Soviet Union was a nightmare to any stout defender of it. 
Brown makes this final comment on Gorbachev: "It is to Gorbachev's 
lasting credit that when he found that reform led to resistance from all the vested 
interests which it threatened, and he was, accordingly, faced with the choice of 
restoring the status quo ante or moving on to accept the risk of system-
transformative change, it was the latter course he adopted."3 He may not have 
been a democrat in the western sense but. unusually in Russian and Soviet 
history, he was a leader with a very strong conscience. 
1 Strayer, \Vhy did the So\<iet Union collapse?, p. l 99. 
2 Ibid 
3 Bro\\-11, The Gorbachev factor. p.309. 
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